2019

Participatory Deliberative Democracy for Peace in El Salvador

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Abstract

Postconflict societies such as El Salvador, surpassing 25 years of relative peace since signing the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords, have employed many mechanisms to rebuild and establish lasting peace. This study explores the impacts of four types of deliberative democracy mechanisms employed in this postconflict context to build grassroots participation in public policy-making: *cabildos abiertos* (open town hall meetings), *asociaciones de desarrollo comunitario* (community development associations), *presupuestos participativos* (participatory budgeting), and *planes estratégicos participativos* (participatory strategic plans). Findings suggest that individual participation in these forms of deliberative democracy implemented in postconflict El Salvador is associated with increased trust in local government. However, participation is also associated with higher levels of direct experience with personal violence and decreased satisfaction with one's community. Findings suggest that implementing participatory deliberative democracy mechanisms in postconflict contexts is not alone enough to address the critiques of top-down liberal peacebuilding. Participatory forums for policy-making in postwar contexts should be designed and employed with conflict dynamics in mind to foster possible positive effects of deliberative democracy while mitigating potential negative effects on peacebuilding.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

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Introduction

Postconflict peacebuilding is one of the greatest challenges of deeply divided societies. Over the years, scholars and peace practitioners have offered a variety of approaches to institutionalize practices that restore stability in a country's political, economic, and social spheres following a war. One of the emerging themes in the field is the importance of introducing participatory mechanisms in postconflict contexts to help determine policy, to complement power-sharing agreements or state-building initiatives in top-level political institutions. It is viewed as a possible response to the liberal peacebuilding approach, which has been widely critiqued for undervaluing local knowledge (e.g., Cooper, 2007) and demonstrating a poor record of success (e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Suhrke & Samset, 2007). Participatory deliberative democracy (PDD) is a mechanism, I argue, with the potential to build what Johan Galtung (1969) refers to as negative peace, or the absence of violence, as well as positive peace, which refers to social justice or improved quality of life.

There is ample research now available indicating that PDD participation contributes to promising political, economic, and social impacts in communities worldwide (e.g., Abers, 1998, 2001; Boulding & Wampler, 2010; Leighninger, 2016; Wampler, 2012). Deeply divided societies and fragile states are arguably most in need of the outcomes associated with PDD in other contexts, specifically: enhanced political legitimacy, improved individual and collective capabilities and resource redistribution, and renewed social cohesion and friendships across conflict party lines. The implementation of PDD in postconflict contexts may well result in similarly beneficial outcomes for deeply divided societies. This article critically investigates the promises of PDD in deeply divided societies and the extent to which these are realized in practice. It asks: Are the theoretical outcomes of PDD achieved in practice in a postconflict context?

The case selected for this study is postconflict El Salvador, an acclaimed success story for international peacebuilding efforts rooted in the liberal peace tradition. Though El Salvador is known for high levels of crime and gang-related violence today, it is touted as an exemplary case of "successful democratic transition" (Bland, 2011, p. 864) and one of the "most successful peace mission(s)" (Lopez-Reyes, 1997, p. 39) of the early peacekeeping operations led by the United Nations (UN). It is also a country that has increasingly promoted the use of PDD mechanisms at the local level just prior to and throughout the postwar era.

Using individual level survey data from the 2008 AmericasBarometer (Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2008), I investigate the impacts of participation in various forms of PDD on Salvadoran experiences and perceptions across economic, social, and political dimensions related to peacebuilding. PDD processes included in the analysis are *cabildos abiertos* (open town hall meetings), *asociaciones de desarrollo comunitario* (community development associations), *presupuestos participativos* (participatory budgeting), and *planes estratégicos participativos* (participatory strategic plans). Ten AmericasBarometer questions were operationalized to measure the outcomes related to peace, including trust in local government, perceptions of economic well-

being, trustworthiness and shared values with one's neighbors, perception and experience of conflict, and overall life and community satisfaction.

My analysis concludes that participation in PDD in postconflict El Salvador is associated with improvements in government trust, however, participation is also associated with increased experience of violence and decreased satisfaction with one's community. These findings suggest that PDD may not contribute to peace in an advantageous manner for participants, although it may support liberal state-building efforts by enhancing confidence in local level governance. For researchers on deliberative democracy, there is great promise in the finding that political trust can indeed be bolstered through participation, even in a context as highly conflictive and polarized as postconflict El Salvador. These results also suggest, however, that warnings about the implementation of PDD in deeply divided societies are valid with regards to equality and possible manipulation and extend even further to include the potential for increased physical vulnerability of participants.

Literature Review

A postconflict context is "a conflict situation in which open warfare has come to an end (though) such situations remain tense for years or decades and can easily relapse into large-scale violence" (Junne & Verkoren, 2005, p. 1). This context is faced with the challenge of peacebuilding, which entails "comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para. 55).

Following the Cold War, postconflict peacebuilding discourse and practice has been dominated by the "liberal peacebuilding" approach, which contends that a combination of democracy, rule of law, and marketized economies can bring peace (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009, p. 3). The United Nations, particularly former Secretary Generals Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has been one of the staunchest advocates of this approach in practice. Scholars such as Joshua Muravchik and Larry Diamond have been strong promoters of this approach as well (Paris, 2004). The democratic "peace thesis" is the logic underpinning this approach, arguing that democracies do not tend to go to war with one another (Doyle, 1983a, 1983b; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Owen, 1994; Rummel, 1983), and research suggesting that strong democratic institutions can decrease the incidence of internal conflicts associated with ethnic divisions (Easterly, 2001).

Over the past two decades, however, this approach to peacebuilding has come under harsh criticism (Barnett, 2006; Jahn, 2007a, 2007b; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007; Pugh, Cooper & Turner, 2008; Richmond & Franks, 2009). It has been called out for supporting a top-down liberal project whose logics do not match the fragile realities of postconflict societies. The top-down character of liberal peacebuilding is manifest in policies that tend to favor the elite, which can further marginalize those already on the bottom of the social ladder and thus reignite active conflict (Richmond, 2013). Additionally, liberal peace imposes Western values on societies that may not hold the same perspectives on life, liberty, and property (Paris, 2004, pp. 33-34). Above all, the approach does not have a great track record of success. Charles Call and Susan Cook (2003, pp. 1-2) find that 72% of UN peacekeeping missions that included a democratization component ended up with an authoritarian regime as of the early 2000s.

Principles of liberalism, meanwhile, also pose challenges to postconflict societies. It has been widely documented that elections in postconflict settings have a mixed record of success. Scholars have linked elections to increased levels of violence in postconflict contexts (Kumar, 1998; Reilly, 2004), as in various cases across Southeast Asia—Timor Leste, the Philippines, and Malaysia (Ramcharan, 2016)—and Africa including the cases of Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal (Adebayo, 2012; Matlosa & Zounmenou, 2011). Postconflict elections have also been linked to inferior economic recovery and longer recovery periods (Flores & Nooruddin, 2012). For scholars like Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom (2008), national level elections should no longer be the sole focus of state-building initiatives in promoting durable peace.

As critics of the liberal peace approach have gained greater voice, there has been an increasing recognition that midlevel and grassroots leadership (Lederach, 1997), civil society (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006), and the general public (Al Qurtuby, 2013) should also be engaged in peacebuilding. Mechanisms within the PDD tradition—defined as those which emphasize political inclusion and citizen empowerment alongside deliberation by encouraging public discourse in the policy-making process (Cini & Felicetti, 2018)—may be an appropriate response to such calls. Indeed, Jürg Steiner, Maria Clara Jaramillo, Rousiley Maia, and Simona Mameli (2017, p. 1) suggest that "deliberation is particularly important for countries with deep societal divisions… since more deliberation may be the best hope to have more peaceful relations in these countries."

There is a variety of formal PDD mechanisms with differing degrees of quality, and these have long been explored within the scholarship on deliberative democracy. Variations of PDD include deliberative polls, citizens' juries, town hall meetings, participatory planning, and participatory budgeting among others (Coleman, Przybylska & Sintomer, 2015; Fung & Wright, 2001; Gastil & Levine, 2005; Smith, 2005). Several typologies have been developed to classify mechanisms and describe their quality. Sherry Arnstein (1969) describes how participatory democratic spaces range from manipulative to empowered citizen control, with several rungs on her "ladder of citizen participation" in between. The higher up the ladder a particular process sits, the more the final decision is rooted in the actual information exchanged and "citizen power." Similar normative typologies have been developed by Jules Pretty (1995) and Sarah White (1996) in the context of participatory development planning and programming. Other typologies based on design or structure have been developed by Archon Fung (2003) and Gene Rowe and Lynn Frewer (2005). Rikki John Dean (2017) has classified participation based on sociality (whether it promotes agnostic or solidaristic interaction) and negotiability (based on how participation is prescribed or negotiated). Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (2001, p. 7) identify a subset of Empowered Deliberative Democracy mechanisms that "aspire to deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in and influence policies that directly affect their lives." Thus, while various forms of PDD have been employed around the globe, not all forms empower participants to the same degree. Given this variation, effects also vary.

These insights are crucial in understanding the role of PDD in postconflict contexts. I argue that the importance of PDD to postconflict reconstruction is to contribute in building what Galtung (1969, p. 183) refers to as negative and positive peace—the former refers to the "absence of personal [physical] violence," while the latter is the "absence of structural violence." This article investigates the relationship between multiple dimensions of peace as an outcome and PDD as one of the determinants of such an outcome. To unpack this distinction further, I suggest that positive peace may be disentangled to three components across political, economic, and social dimensions.

Political Component

One political impact of PDD is the enhanced legitimacy of formal political institutions. When PDD mechanisms are successful in upholding the conditions required for deliberation, the procedure bolsters political trust through public engagement. The conditions for success in achieving this aim are fourfold (Cohen, 2003, pp. 347-348). First, participants must engage freely in the PDD forum; in other words, they should choose to associate with the processes independently. Second, deliberation should involve reasoned discussion in which all parties advance their positions and justify their views, as well as listen to their interlocutors. Third, involved parties should be of equal standing. Fourth, although consensus is a desirable aim, other decision procedures should also be in place.

The successful realization of these procedures enhances the level of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of formal political institutions, which in turn generates citizens' trust. Joan Font and Ismael Blanco (2007, p. 559) outline three linkages between participatory forums (in their case citizen juries in Spain) and political trust by "creating a sense of citizenship and engagement in public affairs; their influence in decision-making; and their capacity to produce outputs that more closely mirror citizens' preferences." While public acceptance of PDD and its ability to achieve these aims are still being questioned and tested (e.g. Boulianne, 2019), the central argument here is that PDD can enhance the likelihood that decisions made within the PDD forum will be upheld in future policy implementation. Thus, as Joshua Cohen (2003, p. 162) indicates, participants in deliberative democracy "prefer institutions in which the connections between deliberation and the outcomes are evident." This is why so many of the extant PDD typologies emphasize "citizen control," "transformative" participation, or "empowerment." Indeed, Fung (2015, p. 4) suggests that "the most important institutional design question for such processes concerns the extent to which they are empowered."

There are, however, no guarantees that PDD procedures result in these outcomes. Deliberative forums may favor either the majority or the most powerful in cross-cultural or divisive communities. As Alice Siu and Dragan Stanisevski (2012, p. 85) describe, "Deliberation could do more harm than good not only to the participants, but also to democracy; societal inequalities are inevitably brought into deliberative settings and could exasperate intercultural conflicts." In New Hampshire, school board participation became hostile when religious conservatives achieved majority representation and sought to ban more liberal education curricula (Holt-Shannon & Mallory, 2014). In Spain's Basque Country, several iterations of deliberative forums were attempted and ultimately failed because the elite politicians controlling the participatory forums could not move beyond fixed, ideological positions. As Sanjay Jeram and Daniele Conversi (2014, p. 70) shares, "the main actors with a stake in the Basque conflict remained steadfast in their positions on how peace would be achieved, even if these were not in line with public opinion."

Economic Component

Harry Blair (2000) finds evidence that participation in local governance results in benefits to universal services in health and education, while S. R. Osmani (2001) finds improved efficiency and equity of social services as outcomes across multiple cases and contexts. Participatory budgeting, in particular, has been associated with redistributing wealth to the poor (Abers, 1998; Marquetti, Schonerwald da Silva & Campbell, 2012). Hartmut Schneider (1999) reviews case

studies on participatory engagement in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Malaysia, and the Philippines with links to poverty reduction by way of rooting policies in better information, ensuring that decision-makers are committed, and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery. Indeed, citizen councils implemented in some developing countries are focused explicitly on community dialogue and collaboration for economic development, even though good intentions have fallen short in rural areas of Uganda (Kakumba, 2010) and Cameroon (Njoh, 2011). In a case study on participatory governance in rural Guatemala, Johanna Speer (2011) finds that, in combination with local elections, PDD can contribute to local government responsiveness in a postconflict context.

Economically, PDD may produce impacts in two complementary ways. First, PDD can enhance one's capabilities to improve his or her station in life, a concept stemming from the capabilities approach (Sen, 1999). By allowing for public participation in policy-making, PDD gives individuals the agency to choose policy outcomes and engage in empowered capacity building (Blanco & Ballester, 2011; Schneider, 1999; Schugurensky, 2004). As individual capabilities combine through deliberation to achieve a common policy goal, they create "collective capabilities" that "allow poor communities to create and seize new opportunities to collectively invest in their financial, human, and social capital" (Ibrahim, 2006, p. 399). Second, Fung (2015) and Terry Cooper, Thomas Bryer, and Jack Meek (2006) make similar cases for improving the effectiveness of government via "participatory multisectoral problem solving" or "citizen-centered collaborative public management," respectively. Fung (2015, p. 6) describes how mechanisms such as dialogue circles can help "identify the best solutions in terms of feasibility, effectiveness, implementation timeframe, cost, and the need for coordination" as a means to improve governance effectiveness. Cooper and his colleagues (2006) suggest that deliberative approaches are most likely to improve public management.

As in the case of political outcomes, it is also possible that PDD facilitates the further entrenchment of horizontal inequalities (HI). Frances Stewart (2010, p. 2) argues that "according to the HI hypothesis, it is a combination of cultural differences and political and economic inequalities running along cultural lines that, at least in part, explain contemporary violent conflict." If PDD highlights group-based inequalities, particularly along socioeconomic dimensions, the population en masse may be more likely to engage in conflict as a form of rebellion. Indeed, economic development in general has the potential to negatively impact postconflict contexts by increasing inequality both vertically between rich and poor and horizontally between groups (Langer, Stewart & Venugopal, 2012). In Rwanda, for example, economic policies such as those surrounding land distribution that were instituted following the genocidal war have made some inroads to resolving geographically-based inequalities, but have not addressed the rural-urban divide which tends to separate ethnic groups (Leander, 2012).

Social Component

Though less commonly explored, some scholars have shown that enhanced social cohesion and a stronger civil society can result through the development of a deliberative public sphere (Baiocchi, 2003; Wampler, 2012). As Gianpaolo Baiocchi (2003, p. 62) explains, following a long-term observation of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, "Participants often mentioned a sense of belonging to a larger community of citizens who are facing problems together." In a study on two different forms of neighborhood councils in the Netherlands, participants reported that they saw

the participatory, deliberative councils as a "social meeting place." Indeed, an explicit goal of councils in one midsized town was to foster social integration and connectedness between neighbors (Wagenaar, 2007, p. 20). Laura Black (2012, p. 69) writes about the value of discussion in building and maintaining social relationships when participants have "equal adequate opportunities to speak, understand and fully consider each other's views, and communicate respect for their fellow group members." Similarly, Mark Warren (1999, pp. 340-343) posits that deliberative processes can create trust within society by opening spaces for exchanging perspectives, promoting face-to-face conversation, enhancing the transparency of trade-offs among interests, and encouraging promises between community members. As shared by Claus Offe (1999, p. 70), "Institutions, if appropriately designed, can enable us to trust persons whom we never had contact with and with whom we share no relevant communal allegiance."

These characteristics of PDD overlap with the ideal conditions outlined in intergroup contact theory, which suggests that institutionally supported contact between in- and out-groups of equal status, with implied common interests, can reduce prejudice and ultimately lead to increased trust and affective friendships to achieve common goals (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). As spaces in which citizens meet with their neighbors to discuss community needs and areas of focus for government intervention, PDD programs may open a window of opportunity for individuals impacted by conflict to address the postconflict needs for trust repair, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Scholars have tested intergroup contact theory in postconflict and conflict contexts as diverse as Northern Ireland (Tam et al., 2008), South Africa (Dixon et al., 2010; Swart, Hewstone, Christ & Voci, 2011), and Israel-Palestine (Maoz, 2000). In South Africa, intergroup contact was associated with support for policies of redress amongst the White majority, indicating that conflict effects can translate to policy outcomes (Dixon et al., 2010).

That PDD mechanisms can generate social cohesion, however, is not uncontested in existing literature. For example, limited contact or proximity between two groups does not produce the effects outlined above (Allport, 1954). In fact, proximity without contact can exacerbate conflict (Stolle, Soroka & Johnston, 2008). Miles Hewstone and Rupert Brown (1986) argue that "contact is not enough," stressing the importance of group salience, or identification of the individual with whom one is interacting as representative of the "other" versus an outlier. Thus, PDD participants must be seen as both individuals to build affective friendships, and representatives of their respective identity groups to shift perceptions of the "other" beyond the interaction itself (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Along a similar line, Black (2012, p. 75) warns that "participants could identify themselves as members of specific social groups and provide arguments that serve their own best interest rather than sharing a common concern for their collective identity," which, in a conflict setting, may exacerbate conflict. This insight is brought to life in the case of the Civic Forum in Northern Ireland, occasioned in the 1998 Peace Agreement. The Civic Forum was designed to bring together civil society leaders from the North and South twice a year to deliberate on policy issues, but ultimately it became a "political football between unionism and nationalism," which, similar to the Northern Ireland Assembly, did not generate rational dialogue or reason-based debate but instead centered around identity- and interest-based politics stemming from the Troubles (Hayward, 2014, pp. 16-19).

The Study

The literature presented in the previous section demonstrates the many possible outcomes of using PDD mechanisms to generate negative and positive peace outcomes. Whether PDD contributes to a more durable and transformative peace in fragile postconflict states remains an open question, and this study aspires to contribute new insights to this conversation.

My analysis aims to measure the impact of PDD on factors important to peacebuilding to understand whether or not PDD influences peace. I propose five formal hypotheses:

Positive Peace Hypotheses

H_1: PDD participation is associated with increased trust in municipal government and funds management.

H_2: PDD participation is associated with improved perception of individual and national economic well-being.

H_3: PDD participation is associated with increased trust and perception of shared values amongst neighbors.

H_4: PDD participation is associated with increased satisfaction with one's life and neighborhood.

Negative Peace Hypothesis

H_5: PDD participation is associated with decreased incidence of violence and improved perception of neighborhood violence.

PDD theoretically has the potential to address the postwar needs for political legitimacy, individual and collective capabilities to solve community problems, efficient public management, and community cohesion and identity which underpin transformative peace. However, it is also possible that PDD can exacerbate conflict conditions. These links have not yet been empirically tested.

Turning now to the case of postconflict El Salvador, I explore whether or not the underlying logic and theories associated with PDD succeed in producing beneficial political, economic, and social impacts in a deeply divided postwar society. Furthermore, I investigate how, if at all, PDD participation contributes to peace.

Case Study: Postconflict El Salvador

Several Central American countries experienced politically motivated conflicts throughout the 1980s and early 1990s including El Salvador. The height of the conflict in El Salvador lasted from 1980-1991, resulting in the death of over 75,000 Salvadorans (Wood, 2003, p. 8). The two primary parties to the conflict were the Government of El Salvador, relying heavily on the national military, and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), a left-leaning guerrilla group. Some scholars point to the failed US-backed counterinsurgency coup in 1979 as the trigger event of the ensuing civil war, while others cite the institution of controversial agrarian reform, or the murder

of Archbishop Óscar Romero and subsequent mass shooting at his funeral in 1980 (Borgh, 2000; Lopez, 2003; Stanley, 2006; Wood, 2003). The predominant root causes of the conflict are frequently cited as socioeconomic inequality and political exclusion.[1] Though several attempts at negotiating peace were unsuccessful, the involvement of the UN in 1990 made progress toward a ceasefire, constitutional revision, and judicial system restructuring (Negroponte, 2012, pp. 4-9). The Chapultepec Peace Accords were signed on January 16, 1992, officially ending the civil war.

As multiple researchers indicate, El Salvador entered the postwar era with little to no experience with peaceful democracy (Thompson, 1997, p. 458; Ucles, 1992, p. 110). El Salvador introduced decentralized governance and local-level deliberative democracy mechanisms in the lead-up to the peace agreement and its immediate aftermath. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, various decentralization laws were established nationally to gradually devolve more power to municipalities. The Municipal Code of 1986, in particular, gave municipalities increased autonomy and independent decision-making power. It also outlined several PDD mechanisms to be employed at the local level. Specifically, local governments were given the scope to implement forms of open town hall meetings, community development associations, participatory budgeting, and participatory strategic plans in the postconflict context (International City/County Management Association, 2004b; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1995).

These reforms built upon a movement already in motion to open up new spaces for political and civil society participation in a context where democracy had not existed previously. Two forces throughout the 1980s compelled El Salvador's shift toward democracy. First, "international actors pursued a liberal strategy of conflict resolution by promoting democracy;" and second, "Salvadoran elites had begun to adopt liberal norms… in order to legitimate themselves to the international community" (Peceny & Stanley, 2001, p. 163). Mario Lungo Ucles (1992) outlines how workers unions began to form just before the war, and, although abated temporarily by the onset of violence, resurged with greater power and appeal across ideological divides as of the mid-1980s. He goes on to indicate that these types of inlets to political inclusion ultimately contributed to bringing FMLN to the negotiating table and carving out their long-term space within the political system.

While other postconflict countries in the region made similar maneuvers, participation and local governance in El Salvador has the most detailed track record of implementation by international, national, and nongovernmental organizations (Bland, 2011, 2017; International City/County Management Association, 2004a; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs , 1995a; Negroponte, 2012; RTI International, 2002; Torres & Humberto López, 2008; United States

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[1] The root causes of El Salvador's civil war are complex and intertwined. Some scholars point to the country's history of colonialism and the resultant postindependence inequality between elite oligarchs that owned the majority of the land and the peasants that worked their land under conditions of intense poverty (Celis Falcon, 2015; Lopez-Reyes, 1997; Thompson, 1997; Wade, 2008). Indeed, early reports indicated that up to 69% of the largely agrarian population were "landless" in El Salvador when the war began, though these statistics and the extent to which land rights instigated the war were heavily debated in a series of articles following the war's end (Diskin, 1996; Seligson, 1995, 1996). Others point to political exclusion as a root cause of the conflict, tracing back the emphasis placed on political reforms in the peace negotiations to the impetus of war (Call, 2003; Martín-Baró, 2000; Quan, 2005; Thompson, 1997; Ucles, 1992). Finally, US intervention in the internal conflict as a proxy war for the Cold War is cited as both contributing to the neoliberal economic policies that drove inequality and the financing of the war's continuation (Call, 2003; Celis Falcon, 2015; Quan, 2005).

Agency for International Development, 2005). A variety of international actors were involved in funding systems and capacity building for municipal governments, especially participatory civic engagement. Prior to the end of the civil war, the US launched a program called Municipalities in Action, which promoted open town hall meetings (Instituto Salvadoreño de Desarrollo Municipal, 2017). RTI International and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) continued the effort under the Municipal Development and Citizen Participation Project from 2000 to 2002 (RTI International, 2002). From 2003 to 2005, the same partnership instituted the Democratic Local Governance Activity, which launched participatory budgeting and planning in 28 municipalities (USAID, 2005). Building on these pilot programs, dramatic revisions to the Municipal Code in 2006 mandated several participatory decision-making processes, institutionalizing PDD at the local level (Bland, 2017; SSDT, 2011). With substantial evidence to guide and inform an investigation of the impact of PDD mechanisms in a postconflict context, El Salvador is an ideal postconflict country to explore the impact of PDD on the peace process.

Two reports published in 1995 and 2005 provide insights as to the quality of deliberation inherent in Salvadoran PDD mechanisms. Open town hall meetings allow "representatives of each community to advance to the microphone and present their community's list of priority projects that they would like to undertake" followed by a council meeting to vote on the projects (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1995, p. 11). This suggests a more limited role for community members to fully deliberate or take part in decision-making in these spaces. Community development associations are comprised of approximately 11 leaders who "work closely with the members of the community to resolve problems and discuss issues" (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1995, p. 8). Leaders in community associations are formally elected in community assemblies and obtain legal status to accept funds and execute projects in their communities, suggesting that a higher quality of deliberation is possible. Finally, participatory budgeting mechanisms are described as employing a facilitator-led "group workshop technique" including "dialogue, followed by agreement, commitment, and rendering of accounts" (USAID, 2005, p. 40). These descriptions of participatory budgeting spaces also indicate a higher degree of deliberation and partnership between the government and its citizens. Thus, while all of the mechanisms explored here engage citizens and include deliberative components, their deliberative quality varies.

Although the abovementioned practitioner evaluations and academic studies explore El Salvador's integration of participatory deliberative democracy initiatives in the postwar era, findings have been limited to the success of implementation and sustainability of PDD mechanisms versus the effects of PDD in this postconflict setting. Given El Salvador's distinctive implementation of PDD and its detailed track record, this case presents a unique opportunity to explore linkages between the introduction of participatory forms of governance and peacebuilding.

Methods and Data

This study employs a quantitative approach to associate one's participation in PDD initiatives in El Salvador with impacts on individual political, economic, and social experiences and perspectives tied to peace. The central research question is: Are the theoretical outcomes of PDD achieved in practice in a postconflict context?

Two types of quantitative models are used in this analysis, including multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models and logit models, as relevant for each dependent variable based on its characteristic as a continuous or binomial variable. Stepwise regression was not used in development of either type of model.

The dataset is based on AmericasBarometer, a nationally representative survey of individual public perceptions related to the economy, social issues, and politics across Latin American countries since the 1980s. Beginning in 2004, the survey has been conducted biennially with a core set of questions and revolving country-specific inquiries. Each survey round takes place during even-numbered years using a team of local survey interviewers. The unit of observation for the survey is the individual. In 2008, the survey was designed to pull a representative sample both nationally and by region. Survey questions are asked face-to-face and conducted in Spanish (Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2008).

Between February and March of 2008, 1,549 individual respondents across 66 municipalities (representative of El Salvador's national population) were asked three questions related to their participation in PDD initiatives (Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2008). This unique question set has not been asked again since. Individuals were asked whether they had participated in open town hall meetings in the prior year; how frequently they attend meetings for the betterment of the community, a proxy for community development associations; and whether they had participated in developing the municipal budget in the prior year, operationalized as participation in either participatory budgeting or participatory strategic planning as mechanisms that engage citizens in budgetary decision-making. Also, and importantly for the purposes of this study, the survey asks respondents about politics, the economy, social cohesion, violence, and life satisfaction. Finally, the survey includes a wide variety of other demographic and community development data points appropriate for use as control measures. The technical information on the 2008 dataset from El Salvador indicates that survey sample is self-weighted as a feature of the multistage, stratified sampling strategy employed.

Ultimately, the aim of this analysis is to ascertain the association between PDD and peace using Galtung's distinction between "negative" and "positive" variants. While this conceptualization of peace is widely used to describe the aspirations of peacebuilding in the wake of conflict, no defined set of measures exists. Traditionally, "negative peace" has been measured by the durability of peace agreements without relapse into conflict, often explored using data on war duration, battle deaths, and conflict termination (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). "Positive peace" is often measured by the transformative effects of peacebuilding on self-sufficiency and well-being (Lederach, 1997) or harmony (Anderson, 2004). Given that PDD engages individuals in policy-making as key actors, it is relevant to explore the empirical effects of PDD at the individual versus the national level. Royce Anderson (2004) is one of the few scholars who suggests specific measures of both types of peace at various levels, including individual-level indicators. He outlines potential subjective and objective measures of each, including statistics on violence or an individual's own assessment of violence levels for "negative peace" and statistics on social integration or an individual's assessment of community harmony for "positive peace." For my analysis, I operationalized dependent variables within the 2008 AmericasBarometer survey for both "negative" and "positive" peace alongside potential political, economic, and social outcomes that have been suggested by theory and experience with PDD. Two variables were

selected in every category as a check for each construct. The questions used as measures and their operationalization of the concepts outlined above are listed in Table 1 below.

Table 1

Key Concept Measures and Operationalization

2008 AmericasBarometer Questions	Operationalization
1) How much confidence do you have in your municipality? 2) What level of confidence do you have in your municipality's management of public funds?	Positive peace (political): confidence and trust in municipal government
1) Considering the economy… how would you describe the economic situation of the country? Is it good, regular, or bad? 2) How would you describe your personal economic situation? Is it good, regular, or bad?	Positive peace (economic): confidence in the economy and personal economic well-being
1) Speaking about the people from around here, would you say that the people from your community are very trustworthy, sometimes trustworthy, a little trustworthy, or not trustworthy? 2) Aside from our differences, Salvadorans have many things and values in common that unite us as a country. To what extent do you agree with this phrase?	Positive peace (social): trust in one's neighbors and shared identity expressed through values
1) What is your level of satisfaction with your life? 2) Thinking of all the things we've discussed, would you say you are satisfied with the place in which you live?	Positive peace (overall): overall satisfaction with individual and community life
1) Speaking of your city or neighborhood, is the level of violence high, medium, or low? 2) Have you been a victim of any act of crime in the last 12 months?	Negative peace (overall): perception of violence in the community and direct experience with crime

While the selected measures from the AmericasBarometer survey offer insights into each dimension, there are several limitations to using a secondary data source that I have not developed myself. With regards to the political dimension of "positive peace," there is not a question on the survey related to individual self-confidence or government legitimacy outright. Therefore, I have chosen to operationalize variables related to trust in municipal government, which is suggestive of a higher level of legitimacy. Similar limitations apply to economic and social outcome measures. While none of the selected measures is an exact translation of theory, perception of economic well-being would presumably be more positive as resource distribution becomes more equitable and governance more effective. Likewise, trust and shared values amongst community members would suggest stronger social cohesion and shared identities amongst neighbors.

Measures of overall "positive" and "negative" peace are also not ideal constructs, but there is precedent for using the measures selected. For example, the IEP Mexico Peace Index includes various indicators for crime. Importantly, their conceptualization of "violent crime" includes robbery, assault, and sexual assault while "organized crime" includes kidnapping, extortion, and narcotics crimes. The AmericasBarometer records incidences of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, and violent threats. As such, it is reasonable to use a measure that includes both violent and nonviolent crime as a measure of "negative peace." Galtung's "positive peace" strives for an improved quality of life. John Paul Lederach (1997, p. 75) expands upon this conceptualization in describing the transformative aim of peacebuilding as "the goal of moving a given population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of self-sufficiency and well-being." He goes on to explain that conflict party relationships across personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions signal progress toward this outcome. Thus, I use one's overall satisfaction with life and neighborhood to align with Lederach's (1997) notion of the transformative aim of peacebuilding processes. Carol Ferrans and Marjorie Powers (1992) find a strong correlation between the more sophisticated Quality of Life Index and one's assessment of life satisfaction, justifying the use of this measure in my models. Furthermore, I have not limited my analysis of positive peace to just one dimension, but included the political, economic, and social indicators as outlined above to explore this dimension of peace as well.

Control variables in the models include individual demographic and community characteristics. Individual-level demographics such as age, gender, and employment status may impact how much time one can invest in PDD processes. Community-level characteristics such as urban versus rural setting may influence how much access one might have to PDD processes: smaller rural communities may have less of a challenge getting widespread and diverse participation as there are fewer individuals to target for outreach, but they often face challenges in terms of geography and household dispersion. The community's level of development may also indicate how many resources the community can dedicate to these processes.

Given that the data used in this analysis is cross-sectional, there is not a promising means of tracking change over time. As such, it is not possible to determine definitively whether PDD is producing the associated impacts or if participants come into PDD forums with the associated perceptions and experiences already in place. My models therefore compare those that participate with those that do not to demonstrate how PDD may influence static-state variables. To specify the key independent variable for PDD, a new dummy variable was generated in the dataset, combining responses to the three questions related to participation in open town hall meetings, community development associations, and participatory budgeting or strategic planning (1-participants, 0-not participants). Thirty-two percent (510) of the population surveyed reported having participated in some form of PDD in the prior year, with the majority reporting participation in "a community association for the betterment of the community." As the Latin American Public Opinion Project survey does not maintain a consistent response scale for questions about perception, both the original measures and, subsequently, a rescaled version of each variable was used in the models. A full set of descriptive statistics for each variable in the models is included in the Appendix.

Analysis

To set the stage for analyzing the relationship between PDD and its impact on individual experiences and perceptions theoretically tied to peacebuilding, I begin this analysis by presenting key demographic characteristics and perceptions of the nationally representative survey sample. AmericasBarometer survey respondents in 2008 had an average household income of $145-288 per month, and about a quarter of families report receiving remittances from abroad. Slightly more women (52%) are included in the sample than men (48%)—this is not a flaw in sample design or nonresponse bias since this gender distribution is also present in El Salvador's 2007 national census data. Sixty-six percent of survey respondents report their ethnicity as *mestizo* or Hispanic-White mix, 20% report as White, and the remaining 14% report as indigenous, Afro-Salvadoran, *mulata* or Black-White mix, or other in order of cumulative percentage. Politically, slightly more individuals identify with left-leaning (traditionally identifying with the FMLN party) versus right-leaning (traditionally identifying with the Nationalist Republican Alliance or ARENA party) ideologies. Though most people have not personally experienced a violent attack in the past year, nearly everyone agrees that crime is a threat to the future of the country. Larger cities are seen as more violent than smaller cities, with 62% of the sample reported living in urban areas. Notably, the culture of distrust of those outside one's circle of acquaintance is extremely high: 95% of respondents say that one should be careful when deciding whether or not to trust others.

As compared to nonparticipants in the full dataset, participants in PDD are generally more publicly engaged both with political parties as well as in general civic engagement through voting, but they do not have a discernable political affiliation that leans more to the left or right as compared to the overall population. As one might expect, participants in PDD believe that they have a role in resolving community problems and mobilizing to combat crime. They tend to be more involved in community collaboration overall through school committees, women's groups, professional associations, unions, and protests, the latter two of which are only slightly more than the average Salvadoran. Though they do not work for government in numbers greater than the general population, they have greater knowledge of their local officials than those who do not participate.

Turning now to the main quantitative analysis, an OLS regression model, and when relevant for binary (0/1) outcome variables, a logit model was developed for each dependent variable. The models controlled for urban/rural living, community development indicators, gender, race, age, religion, occupation, monthly household income, and political affiliation.

Table 2 below shows the key model result by dependent variable. Coefficients and standard deviations are reported for OLS Models while odds ratios standard errors are reported for the two logit models. Full regression and logit model results are included in the Appendix. Verbal interpretations to follow for logit models have been calculated using the postestimation command mfx in Stata, which calculates the marginal probabilities for each variable at the means of the independent variables in the model. Marginal probabilities were calculated at the sample mean of the dependent variable and were only slightly divergent from the results of the mfx calculation.

Table 2

OLS Regression and Logit Model Results

Key Model Variables	Independent Variable
	PDD
Dependent Variables	**Coefficient (S.D.) / Odds Ratio (S.E)**
Positive peace (political)- trust in municipal funds management	.330 (.059)*
Positive peace (political)- trust in municipal government	.415 (.112)*
Positive peace (economic)- perception of country's economic well-being	.018 (.051)
Positive peace (economic)- perception of personal economic well-being	-.024 (.048)
Positive peace (social)- perception of shared Salvadoran values	-.092 (.084)
Positive peace (social)- trust of others in the neighborhood	-.034 (.058)
Positive peace (overall)- satisfaction with one's personal life	.022 (.049)
Positive peace (overall)- satisfaction with one's neighborhood	**-.252 (.154)*****
Negative peace (overall)- personal experience with violence	**.435 (.160)***
Negative peace (overall)- perception of violence in the neighborhood	-.012 (.046)

*p<.01, **p<.05, ***p<.10

Note: Numbers in bold indicate a logit versus OLS model, in which odds ratios and standard errors are reported in place of coefficients and standard deviations.

On the political dimension, PDD participation has a strong positive and statistically significant impact on trust in municipal government and their public resource management at the p<.01 level. The other key factor that contributes to trust in municipal financial management is income level, with those earning more having a higher degree of trust. For overall municipal trust, race (specifically for White and Afro-Salvadoran populations) is associated with higher degrees of confidence. Political party is also a factor: those with left-leaning political ideologies trust municipal government less.

Related to economic well-being, PDD does not show a statistically significant effect Political affiliation was associated with a negative perception of the national economy and individual economic welfare at the p<.01 level. Those on the left generally find the country's economy and their own economic well-being to be worse off than those on the right. As one might expect, higher income levels were associated with a more positive economic outlook. Education was also a positive factor for individual economic well-being, which is not surprising given that this variable is often correlated with income level. In this dataset, the two are positively correlated at r=.53, p<.001. Additional years of age is associated with a more negative perception of national and individual economic standing. Finally, living in a rural area is associated with a more positive perception of one's individual economic well-being.

Regarding the social measures of positive peace, trustworthiness of one's neighbors, and shared values, participation in PDD is not associated at a significant level with a change in the dependent variables. Age, income level, and rural living had a statistically significant and positive impact on perception of shared national values. However, no variable had a statistically significant association with trust in one's neighbors.

For positive peace, experience with PDD has an impact on one's satisfaction with the community where he/she lives at the p<.10 level, but no statistically significant impact on satisfaction with life. However, political party and income have a statistically significant association with both measures of overall satisfaction. Those of a left-leaning ideology are less satisfied with their own lives and communities, while those at a higher income level are more satisfied. Unemployment and age are negatively associated with satisfaction in one's life, whereas gender and education negatively influence one's neighborhood perception.

Participants in PDD perceive the level of violence in their communities similarly to those who do not participate, but they more frequently report having been recent victims of violence, a finding significant at the p<.01 level. Controlling for all variables in the model, the marginal effect of participation in PDD on personal experience with crime is a .162 (16.2 percentage points) estimated change in the probability associated with those who participate at the sample mean of all independent variables in the model. People of a left-leaning ideology also report more encounters with violence, and their perception of violence in their neighborhood is worse. Additional years of age is associated with fewer experiences of personal violence and a better perception of violence levels, but education has the opposite effect on perception. Those in urban areas and with access to running water (indicating a higher level of community development) are at a greater risk of personal encounters with crime. Rural areas have a more positive perception of crime in their neighborhoods.

Measures of model fit show that none of these models are particularly strong in terms of R-squared value, as not one goes above .10. RMSE scores can be interpreted based on the dependent variable in each model. Smaller scores indicate a better model fit, relative to the maximum value of the dependent variable range. While on both of these measures of fit, the scores do not suggest a strong model for prediction, the F-test of the R-squared values indicate that the observed R-squared is reliable, if not particularly helpful in predicting variation for each dependent variable.

Discussion

This statistical analysis reveals that PDD in postconflict El Salvador results in mixed and sometimes unexpected outcomes. Not all political, economic, and social indicators that have been linked to PDD participation in other contexts result in statistically significant results in these models. Only four of the ten dependent variables are statistically significant. The theorized connections between PDD and peace are only supported in the political dimension of positive peace. Furthermore, PDD appears to detract from both overall negative and positive peace. Particularly, PDD participation is associated with increased experience of personal violence and a decreased sense of satisfaction with one's neighborhood.

The political dimension outcomes associated with PDD in El Salvador are consistent with the effects of participatory forms of governance identified in the literature regarding increased government legitimacy and trust. As outlined in the literature review, improved civic education and understanding of the political process, coupled with a municipality's increased transparency and accountability through PDD processes, are linked to increased public engagement and trust (Avritzer, 2012; Cabannes, 2004; Hagelskamp, Rinehart, Silliman, & Schleifer, 2016; Wampler, 2012). Postconflict societies regularly struggle with corruption, and it has been shown in the long-term to contribute to the outbreak of conflict by siphoning off much-needed institutional resources for peacebuilding and development (Cheng & Zaum, 2008). If, as the literature reviewed above suggests, political trust stems from improved transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of formal political institutions, then PDD may be a promising strategy to curb corruption.

There is, however, another possible interpretation. Given that individuals choose to participate, these effects may indicate a predisposition to trust local government or reflect political alliances between those who are engaged and their local level leaders. In 2008, the sitting municipal administrations had been in power for two years. I argue, however, that while it is possible that individuals chose to participate specifically with an administration sharing their own political views, this is unlikely given the political context in El Salvador at the time of data collection. When this data was collected, the left-leaning FMLN party only held 21% of mayoral seats as compared to the conservative ARENA party controlling 57% of local governments (Tribuno Supremo Electoral, 2006). The national election in 2009 would be the first time the guerillas, as a political entity, would win the presidency. It is therefore not surprising to see the political party, particularly those with a left-leaning ideology, as a salient negative factor for many of the dimensions explored in this study. Yet the ideological distribution of those who participate in PDD was slightly more left-leaning than right, as with the overall population. Thus, even left-leaning participants in ARENA-governed municipalities demonstrate increased levels of trust in local government.

The results linking PDD with undesirable impacts on measures of negative and positive peace are unexpected and alarming. For negative peace, participation in PDD is associated with higher levels of direct experience with violence—meaning those who participate experience a lower level of negative peace than those who do not participate. Likewise, the hypothesized neighborhood satisfaction impact proposed as a positive peace outcome of PDD is actually negatively associated with participation. This cross-sectional data is insufficient to fully determine whether participation does indeed cause these impacts, but we can look into the wording of the question and timing of the AmericasBarometer survey round to draw a conclusion about time order. Community associations, the citizen participation mechanism most commonly reported in El Salvador within

the dataset, call upon their leadership to serve for two years. Leaders are often reelected to their posts. This survey question is time bound, asking specifically about encounters with crime in the last year. Participation may, therefore, increase the vulnerability of PDD participants as many of them will have fallen victim to crime after getting involved.

Séverine Autesserre (2017, p. 123) argues that one of the key assumptions made in the field of peacebuilding is that "good things always go together." In reality, however "all good things do not necessarily work together. Education, employment, democracy, and micro-level stability do not necessarily promote peace, while bad things (like drug trafficking, corruption, and arms trade) do not necessarily undermine peacebuilding efforts" (Autesserre, 2017, p. 123). The results of this study highlight this point in the case of El Salvador. While PDD shows a promising association with political outcomes, such as increased trust in municipal government, this does not necessarily translate to beneficial outcomes for other equally valuable social or economic indicators. Furthermore, PDD appears to be linked to decreased positive and negative peace for participants in this case.

It is important to remember, when seeking to better understand these results, that the introduction of PDD forums in a postconflict context runs parallel to a variety of other, equally important components that shape the peace processes. In other words, context matters, and this becomes even more important in the aftermath of civil war and negotiated peace agreements. One key macrolevel factor contributing to these findings in El Salvador may be the country's entrenched two-party politics: ARENA representing the wartime military and elite and the FMLN representing the guerrillas, a dynamic coloring of politics and policy at both the national and municipal level even two decades after the end of the civil war. Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild (2005, p. 233) explore the effects of power-sharing arrangements, like that achieved in El Salvador's peace agreement, after civil wars concluding that successful consolidation of peace is rare in these cases. As members of a community of scholars, we have more to learn about how top-down and bottom-up political processes interact to influence peacebuilding. A second contextual factor is the high level of gang-related crime in El Salvador following the war. In 2008, the US Department of State ranked El Salvador as "one of the five most violent countries in the world," averaging ten murders daily (US Department of State, 2008). Also in 2008, El Salvador was reaching the height of its "Iron Fist" campaign against gang activity, and quickly realized that cracking down on gangs with purely punitive measures would result in backlash and an escalation of violence (Hume, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2017). Overall violence levels may both be a catalyst and challenge for PDD participation. The results of this analysis must take into consideration these larger, macrolevel forces occurring in tandem with PDD implementation which also colors the peace process.

Directions for Future Research

Given that these results are only suggestive of associations, but cannot support the case for causality, further research is required to determine the extent of the impact PDD has had on postconflict El Salvador. A cross-sectional dataset analyzed with inferential statistics alone does not allow for a thorough exploration of how and why the observed trends have emerged. Additional investigations could take on two forms.

First, access to longitudinal data with the richness of the 2008 AmericasBarometer survey would potentially resolve the time order and causal direction challenge that cross-sectional data simply cannot overcome. Second, further qualitative research in the form of interviews or observations of El Salvador's existing PDD processes would allow for a more in-depth exploration of PDD structure and deliberative quality.

In addition to the limitation of using a solely quantitative method with cross-sectional data, there are two further limitations related to this quantitative approach. First, given that most individuals involved in PDD are also more politically and socially engaged, there may be an omitted variable bias, mediator, or interaction effect at work in the results reported above, despite having controlled for political party affiliation. In an extended version of the models to test this theory, I added several additional variables in the dataset for participation in community committees, political parties, school groups, and protests, and the model results still suggested the same political dimension trends with statistical significance at an even lower p-value threshold but eliminated statistical significance for positive peace variables. These models are not presented as the number of variables and scarcity of reported participation in some spaces such as protests, weakened model stability resulting in significantly lower adjusted R-squared values. Given this outcome, it is safe to conclude that the models presented are stable, but it is important to note that one's social capital and community engagement overall may contribute to these findings. Future studies should seek to tease out whether other forms of participation in civil society or activism produce similar results to the effects of PDD.

Second, each of the variables selected for operationalization are not perfect measures. With any study conducted using secondary data, creativity must be employed to select the variables that most closely align with the proposed theoretical constructs. Given that the AmericasBarometer survey is a secondary dataset, the measures are not as precise as they could be in a survey designed to explicitly test the quality of deliberation, individual or collective capabilities and identities, or the quality of contact rooted in the theories outlined in this study. A survey tool modeled after those used in prior studies, such as the tools designed by Marco Steenbergen, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli, and Jürg Steiner (2003) or Linda Tropp and Thomas Pettigrew (2005a), may produce more comparable and nuanced results with other studies. Likewise, the measure of PDD itself does not control for or illuminate nuances related to participation frequency, intensity, or even process type. Future studies should aim to control for and possibly even measure the effects of these key factors on peacebuilding-related outcomes.

Conclusion

In this article, I employ several theories and prior case studies to link PDD and political, economic, and social outcomes that could contribute to peacebuilding. However, each link also suggested potential caveats. I find that the theoretically proposed outcomes of PDD have a mixed record of success in postconflict El Salvador. The primary effects of PDD associated with peacebuilding relate to participants' trust in local government, personal experience with violence, and satisfaction with one's place of living. Evidence provided in this study supports the positive impact of participatory deliberative democracy on citizen trust and legitimacy of government, consistent with theory and alternative studies of PDD in alternative contexts. However, results of this analysis do not associate PDD with the economic outcomes hypothesized through the lens of the capabilities approach and collective public management or the social outcomes projected through

the lens of intergroup contact theory. Furthermore, PDD associations with positive and negative peace suggest a potentially troubling case for the future application of these processes in postconflict contexts.

At this stage, there is not enough evidence to explain why these processes that appear to improve political outcomes have little to no effect on economic or social indicators, and detract from positive and negative peace. Further investigation is required to understand the way PDD is being implemented in El Salvador and other postconflict nations to determine whether the mechanisms support not only democratic transition, but also peacebuilding and reconciliation. Theoretical caveats to the success of PDD in deeply divided societies emphasize how the structure and quality of dialogue in PDD spaces matter. Future implementation of participatory deliberative democracy in such contexts should be sensitive to conflict dynamics to ensure that PDD processes are designed so as not to undermine peace but instead promote the deliberative ideal, improve individual and collective capabilities and identities, and uphold the key conditions of intergroup contact to promote sustainable and transformative peace.

If, as scholars have indicated, top-down liberal approaches to peacebuilding fall short in building sustainable peace, increased participatory deliberation within the policy-making process is not a silver bullet either. It is not enough to simply invite participation in the policy cycle in a postconflict context; PDD must be designed and implemented to balance the benefits within the political sphere with economic, social, and peace outcomes intertwined with transformative peace.

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Appendix

Descriptive Statistics and Expected Sign of Relationship by Variable

Variable	Sample Size (n)	Frequency	Percentage	Mean	SD	Expected Sign
Independent Variables						
Participation in Participatory Deliberative Democracy	1549					
Yes (demopart=1)		510	32.92%			
No (demopart=0)*		1039	67.08%			
Dependent Variables						
Positive Peace (Political)- trust in municipal funds management	1502					
No Trust (muni6=1)		489	32.56%			-
Little Trust (muni6=2)		855	56.92%			-
High Trust (muni6=3)		158	10.52%			+
Positive Peace (Political)- trust in municipal government	1544					
No Trust (b32=1)		284	18.39%			-
Little Trust (b32=2)		754	48.83%			-
High Trust (b32=3)		506	32.77%			+
Positive Peace (Economic)- perception of country's economic well-being	1543					
Bad (soct1=1)		1064	68.96%			-
Neutral (soct1=2)		387	25.08%			-
Good (soct1=3)		92	5.96%			+
Positive Peace (Economic)- perception of personal economic well-being	1548					
Bad (idio1=1)		654	42.25%			-
Neutral (idio1=2)		699	45.16%			-
Good (idio1=3)		195	12.60%			+
Positive Peace (Social)- perception of shared Salvadorian values	1539					
Disagree that Salvadorians have shared values (pn2=1)		109	7.08%			-
Neutral (pn2=2)		372	24.17%			-
Agree that Salvadorians have shared values (pn2=3)		1058	68.75%			+
Positive Peace (Social)- trust of others in the neighborhood	1537					
No trust (it1=1)		133	8.65%			-
Little Trust (it1=2)		858	55.82%			-
High trust (it1=3)		546	35.52%			+
Positive Peace (Overall)- satisfaction with life	1544					
Very unsatisfied (ls3=1)		62	4.02%			-
Somewhat unsatisfied (ls3=2)		208	42.81%			
Somewhat satisfied (ls3=3)		661	13.47%			-
Very satisfied (ls3=4)		613	39.70%			+
Positive Peace (Overall)- satisfaction with one's neighborhood	1541					
Unsatisfied (ls4=0)*		295	19.14%			-
Satisfied (ls4=1)		1246	80.86%			+
Negative Peace (Overall)- personal experience of violence	1547					
Yes (vic1=1)		294	19.00%			-
No (vic1=0)*		1253	81.00%			+
Negative Peace (Overall)- perception of violence in neighborhood	1542					
High (vic50=1)		391	25.36%			-
Medium (vic50=2)		514	33.33%			-
Low (vic50=3)		637	41.31%			+

Variable	Sample Size (n)	Frequency	Percentage	Mean	SD	Expected Sign
Control Variables						
Geography- urban or rural hometown	1549					
Urban (ur=0)*		965	62.30%			-
Rural (ur=1)		584	37.70%			+
Community Development Demographics- internet usage	1543					
Daily usage (www1 range: 1 everyday - 5 never)				4.2	1.4	+
Community Development Demographics- cell phone ownership	1548					
No (r4a=0)		274	17.70%			-
Yes (r4a=1)		1274	82.30%			+
Community Development Demographics- clean water access	1549					
No (r12=0)		450	29.05%			-
Yes (r12=1)		1099	70.95%			+
Individual Demographics- age	1549					
Years (q2 range: 18 - 87)				38.5	16.5	+
Individual Demographics- education	1525					
Years (ed range: 0 - 18)				8.4	5.3	+
Individual Demographics- gender	1549					
Male (sexo=0)*		742	47.90%			-
Female (sexo=1)		807	52.10%			+
Individual Demographics- race	1465					
White (etid=1)		289	19.73%			+
Mestiza (etid=2)*		975	66.55%			+
Indigenous (etid=3)		101	6.89%			-
Black/Afro Salvadorian (etid=4)		51	3.48%			-
Other (etid=5)		49	3.34%			-
Individual Demographics- religion	1548					
Catholic (q3=1)		833	53.81%			+
Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal (q3=2,5)		493	31.85%			+
Other (q3=3,6,7)		30	1.94%			-
None (q3=4)*		192	12.40%			-
Individual Demographics- employment status	1548					
Employed (ocupa4a=1,2)*		755	48.77%			+
Student (ocupa4a=4)		111	7.17%			-
Domestic Care (ocupa4a=5)		464	29.97%			+
Retired (ocupa4a=6)		79	5.10%			+
Unemployed (ocupa4a=3,7)		139	8.98%			-
Individual Demographics- income, centered at mean	1490					
Monthly Wage Brackets (q10_mean range: 0 - $1441+) †				$145-288	N/A	+
Individual Demographics- political party	1418					
Right (l1=0)*		831	58.60%			-
Left (l1=1)		587	41.40%			+

† Kept as a continuous variable rather than creating DV as more than 10 income brackets were ennumerated.

* Reference Group

OLS Models: Positive Peace (Political)

Independent Variable	Dependent Variables	
	Positive Peace (Political)- trust in municipal funds management	Positive Peace (Political)- trust in municipal government
	Coefficient (S.D.)	Coefficient (S.D.)
PDD	.330 (.059)*	.415 (.112)*
Control Variables	Coefficient (S.D.)	Coefficient (S.D.)
Age	.002 (.002)	-.002 (.004)
Education	.007 (.007)	-.015 (.014)
Gender (female)	-.093 (.070)	.083 (.134)
Race		
White	.053 (.070)	.225 (.133)***
Mestiza	reference	reference
Indigenous	-.047 (.109)	-.114 (.209)
Black/Afro Salvadorian	-.055 (.159)	.845 (.300)*
Other	-.126 (.157)	.283 (.303)
Religion		
Catholic	.075 (.087)	-.011 (.167)
Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal	.089 (.093)	-.125 (.178)
Other	-.053 (.214)	-.311 (.412)
None	reference	reference
Employment Status		
Employed	reference	reference
Student	.007 (.116)	.217 (.223)
Domestic caregivers	-.024 (.083)	-.206 (.158)
Retired	.300 (.145)	.298 (.277)
Unemployed	.044 (.099)	-.053 (.189)
Income	.040 (.016)*	.028 (.030)
Political party (left-leaning)	.039 (.057)	-.342 (.109)*
Geography (rural)	-.018 (.072)	.181 (.137)
Internet usage	.001 (.027)	.027 (.052)
Cell phone ownership	-.126 (.078)	.118 (.148)
Clean water access	.116 (.073)	.048 (.139)
Model Type		
	OLS	OLS
Model Fit		
Adjusted R-squared	.0475	.0206
RMSE	.9579	1.849
Pseudo R-Squared	-	-
LROC	-	-

*p<.01, **p<.05, ***p<.10

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OLS Models: Positive Peace (Economic)

Independent Variable	Dependent Variables	
	Positive Peace (Economic)- perception of country's economic well-being	Positive Peace (Economic)- perception of personal economic well-being
	Coefficient (S.D.)	Coefficient (S.D.)
PDD	.018 (.051)	-.024 (.048)
Control Variables	**Coefficient (S.D.)**	**Coefficient (S.D.)**
Age	-.008 (.002)*	-.009 (.002)*
Education	-.002 (.006)	.020 (.006)*
Gender (female)	-.060 (.061)	-.030 (.058)
Race		
White	.093 (.061)	.114 (.057)**
Mestiza	reference	reference
Indigenous	-.101 (.096)	-.210 (.089)**
Black/Afro Salvadorian	.024 (.137)	-.022 (.129)
Other	.073 (.138)	-.020 (.130)
Religion		
Catholic	.032 (.076)	-.083 (.072)
Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal	.044 (.081)	-.002 (.076)
Other	.111 (.188)	.146 (.176)
None	reference	reference
Employment Status		
Employed	reference	reference
Student	-.109 (.102)	.109 (.096)
Domestic caregivers	-.118 (.072)	-.013 (.068)
Retired	-.061 (.126)	.069 (.119)
Unemployed	-.037 (.086)	-.183 (.081)**
Income	.013 (.014)	.079 (.013)*
Political party (left-learning)	-.408 (.050)*	-.249 (.047)*
Geography (rural)	.069 (.063)	.110 (.059)***
Internet usage	-.014 (.024)	-.021 (.022)
Cell phone ownership	-.125 (.068)***	-.044 (.064)
Clean water access	.056 (.063)	.058 (.059)
Model Type		
	OLS	OLS
Model Fit		
Adjusted R-squared	.0777	.1554
RMSE	.0622	.7923
Pseudo R-Squared	-	-
LROC	-	-

*p<.01, **p<.05, ***p<.10

OLS Models: Positive Peace (Social)

	Dependent Variables	
	Positive Peace (Social)- perception of shared Salvadoran values	Positive Peace (Social)- trust of others in the neighborhood
Independent Variable	**Coefficient (S.D.)**	**Coefficient (S.D.)**
PDD	-.092 (.084)	-.034 (.058)
Control Variables	**Coefficient (S.D.)**	**Coefficient (S.D.)**
Age	.000 (.003)	.006 (.002)*
Education	.005 (.010)	.000 (.007)
Gender (female)	.014 (.100)	-.072 (.069)
Race		
White	-.125 (.099)	-.042 (.068)
Mestiza	reference	reference
Indigenous	.047 (.155)	-.038 (.107)
Black/Afro Salvadorian	.186 (.223)	.218 (.154)
Other	.068 (.225)	-.043 (.157)
Religion		
Catholic	.024 (.124)	.137 (.086)
Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal	.018 (.132)	.020 (.091)
Other	-.202 (.306)	-.167 (.211)
None	reference	reference
Employment Status		
Employed	reference	reference
Student	-.142 (.166)	.155 (.114)
Domestic caregivers	-.202 (.117)	-.154 (.081)
Retired	-.069 (.206)	.006 (.142)
Unemployed	-.167 (.141)	-.034 (.097)
Income	.009 (.022)	.046 (.015)*
Political party (left-learning)	-.125 (.081)	-.051 (.056)
Geography (rural)	.120 (.102)	.210 (.071)*
Internet usage	-.020 (.039)	.026 (.027)
Cell phone ownership	.157 (.110)	.010 (.077)
Clean water access	.158 (.103)	.113 (.071)
Model Type		
	OLS	OLS
Model Fit		
Adjusted R-squared	.0006	.0282
RMSE	1.374	.9490
Pseudo R-Squared	-	-
LROC	-	-

*p<.01, **p<.05, ***p<.10

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OLS and Logit Models: Positive Peace (Overall)

	Dependent Variables	
	Positive Peace (Overall)- satisfaction with one's personal life	Positive Peace (Overall)- satisfaction with one's neighborhood
Independent Variable	**Coefficient (S.D.)**	**Odds Ratio (S.E.)**
PDD	.022 (.049)	-.252 (.154)***
Control Variables	**Coefficient (S.D.)**	**Odds Ratio (S.E.)**
Age	-.005 (.002)*	.007 (.006)
Education	-.000 (.006)	-.068 (.019)
Gender (female)	.072 (.058)	-.443 (.178)
Race		
White	.081 (.057)	.018 (.186)
Mestiza	reference	reference
Indigenous	.143 (.090)	.059 (.301)
Black/Afro Salvadorian	.076 (.130)	-.184 (.420)
Other	.039 (.131)	-.062 (.422)
Religion		
Catholic	.036 (.072)	.110 (.232)
Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal	.111 (.077)	-.105 (.244)
Other	.309 (.178)	-.190 (.536)
None	reference	reference
Employment Status		
Employed	reference	reference
Student	.034 (.096)	.210 (.285)
Domestic caregivers	-.057 (.068)	.374 (.218)
Retired	.063 (.120)	.009 (.422)
Unemployed	-.232 (.082)*	.072 (.257)
Income	.068 (.013)*	.155 (.043)
Political party (left-learning)	-.156 (.047)*	-.449 (.158)
Geography (rural)	-.012 (.059)	.009 (.194)
Internet usage	.037 (.022)	.101 (.069)
Cell phone ownership	.099 (.064)	-.010 (.212)
Clean water access	.069 (.060)	-.021 (.198)
Model Type		
	OLS	Logit
Model Fit		
Adjusted R-squared	.0532	-
RMSE	.7994	-
Pseudo R-Squared	-	.0465
LROC	-	.6518

*p<.01, **p<.05, ***p<.10

OLS and Logit Models: Negative Peace (Overall)

Independent Variable	Dependent Variables	
	Negative Peace (Overall)- personal experience with violence	Negative Peace (Overall)- perception of violence in the neighborhood
Independent Variable	**Odds Ratio (S.E.)**	**Coefficient (S.D.)**
PDD	.435 (.160)*	-.012 (.046)
Control Variables	**Odds Ratio (S.E.)**	**Coefficient (S.D.)**
Age	-.024 (.007)*	.003 (.002)***
Education	-.005 (.020)	-.012 (.006)**
Gender (female)	.018 (.177)	-.046 (.055)
Race		
White	.005 (.196)	.032 (.055)
Mestiza	reference	reference
Indigenous	.013 (.311)	-.005 (.086)
Black/Afro Salvadorian	.314 (.467)	-.005 (.123)
Other	.279 (.430)	-.085 (.124)
Religion		
Catholic	.006 (.235)	.068 (.069)
Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal	.069 (.251)	-.036 (.073)
Other	-.118 (.584)	-.047 (.169)
None	reference	reference
Employment Status		
Employed	reference	reference
Student	.209 (.261)	.219 (.092)
Domestic caregivers	-.643 (.248)	.051 (.065)
Retired	.084 (.442)	-.094 (.115)
Unemployed	.210 (.258)	.203 (.078)
Income	.038 (.041)	.001 (.012)
Political party (left-learning)	.316 (.163)***	-.126 (.045)*
Geography (rural)	-.781 (.218)*	.277 (.057)*
Internet usage	-.038 (.066)	.027 (.021)
Cell phone ownership	.410 (.261)	-.122 (.061)**
Clean water access	.612 (.236)*	-.086 (.057)
Model Type		
	Logit	OLS
Model Fit		
Adjusted R-squared	-	.0948
RMSE	-	.7589
Pseudo R-Squared	0.1118	-
LROC	0.7347	-

*p<.01, **p<.05, ***p<.10