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Does Culture Matter for Deliberation? Linguistic Speech Cultures and Parliamentary Deliberation in Switzerland

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Abstract

Even though culture is seen as an important aspect of deliberation, empirical research on culture's effects on deliberation is almost completely absent. This paper offers one of the first systematic empirical studies of cultural underpinnings on deliberation. It explores two conceptions of culture, namely 'holistic' vs. 'contextual'. In the 'holistic' approach, culture is assumed to be a constant, while the 'contextual' approach assumes adaptive rationality of actors to different contexts. As an extension of the 'contextual' approach, this paper also explores the effects of different compositions of cultural groups on the quality of deliberation. The effects of the two approaches are evaluated by linking linguistic groups in the committee and plenary debates of the Swiss parliament to a broad variety of deliberative standards. The findings reveal that linguistic groups do not differ much in their deliberative behaviour, which defies 'holistic' approaches to culture. Rather, the results underline that speech culture is highly context-driven, which is indicative of a 'contextual' approach to culture. However, culture still plays a role, but mainly in the context of group composition: the proportion of minority-language speakers affects several deliberative indicators such as respect, common good orientation and clarifying questions.

Keywords

deliberation, culture, linguistic minorities, legislative debates

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While the deliberative approach is regarded by a number of scholars as significant with respect to cultural diversity and for resolving cultural conflicts (e.g. Benhabib, 2002; Deveaux, 2003), the effects that culture has on deliberative behaviour have not yet been explored in a systematic way. This is rather surprising since culture is a key term in the social sciences and most deliberative democrats see culture as an important aspect of deliberation. Dryzek (2009), for example, identifies political culture as an antecedent of deliberative capacity and argues that deliberation may manifest itself differently in different (political) cultures. In a similar vein, Gambetta (1998) claims that a country's culture can either favour or disfavour deliberation but unfortunately he provides no empirical evidence for his arguments. Culture is also seen as a determinant of deliberative capacity by Gastil (2008: 104): "culture comes not only with a worldview but also with a way of speaking and acting, a set of symbols, and rituals." In other words, individuals with different cultural orientations tend to communicate in culturally distinctive ways. To date, the debate over the influence of culture on communication styles has remained largely theoretical and there is hardly any empirical evidence of how and in what ways culture influences deliberation.

In this paper, I seek to contribute to this underdeveloped area of research by focusing on the deliberative behaviour of actors from different cultural (linguistic) backgrounds in the same institutional setting. This approach, first of all, has the advantage that it allows disentangling the effect of culture from institutional variation (see Mutz, 2008). It mimicks the design chosen by Fisman and Miguel (2007): they studied cultural antecedents of corruption by focusing on parking violations of diplomats in New York, where diplomats are put in a different institutional setting "thousands miles" away from their home countries. By concentrating on "cultural" behaviour in the same institutional context, Fisman and Miguel are in a much better position to extract what they call a country's "culture of corruption"; studying corruption in a standard cross-national comparison, institutional and cultural effects are almost impossible to separate. Second, in contrast to the 'political culture' literature, I focus on actual deliberative behaviour in parliamentary proceedings rather than on reported behaviour measured via survey research. As Johnson (2003: 99) convincingly argues, surveys miss the frequently tacit and unstated orientations and practices which make up a 'culture'.

Deliberative behaviour is defined as follows: participants justify their claims, are oriented towards the common good, ask questions, are respectful and empathic, and submit constructive proposals for how a problem can be solved. In addition, I also draw from an expanded approach to deliberative behaviour which includes storytelling (e.g. Dryzek, 2000; Bächtiger *et al*, 2010a; Mansbridge *et al*, 2010). In this study, I analyze committee and plenary debates on language and labour issues in the Swiss parliament. As a multicultural state without a common national language Switzerland is an excellent case for studying various cultural groups within the same institution, focusing on the four language groups in Switzerland, German, French, Italian, and Romansh speakers.

Of course, any study trying to address 'culture' in contemporary political science will be almost automatically exposed to a barrage of criticism, ranging from inadequate conceptualization to fundamental ontological and epistemological objections. No single study can incorporate these objections and simultaneously find a conceptualization of culture that satisfies all. This article starts from the controversial assumption that linguistic groups can be understood as cultural entities, which sets a 'benchmark' against which a number of long-standing claims surrounding the influence of culture on deliberation can be evaluated empirically. Does culture have an 'holistic' influence, as suggested by Gambetta (1998), in that linguistic groups have different "speech cultures" (Young, 1996)? Or, do linguistic groups adapt their "speech cultures" to various institutional contexts and the topics under discussion? Or, as a psychological extension of a 'contextual' approach, do different compositions of cultural groups influence the speech culture of the entire discussion group? My study evaluates these claims by linking linguistic groups in Switzerland to important deliberative ideals such as respect, justification rationality, common good orientation, constructive politics, and storytelling (representing a crucial standard of expanded forms of deliberation).

This paper is structured as follows: the second section provides background on different conceptions of culture in deliberation and outlines the diverse standards of deliberation. The third section provides information on the analysed debates and on the methodology. The empirical results are presented in section four, while section five presents the conclusions.

Defining Culture

In the literature, there is much controversy about what culture is (see, e.g. Patten, 2011). In defining culture, there are vast differences between anthropologists and political scientists (Ballinger, 2006). Anthropologists have studied single cultures through field research, focusing especially on small communities and marginalized populations (e.g. Geertz, 1973). Most anthropologists, however, have not considered state or formal politics (Ballinger, 2006). In political science, by contrast, culture is often conceptualized as 'political culture'. The standard approach in political science views political culture as a set of attitudes, values, norms and beliefs that citizens have vis-à-vis the political system (Fuchs, 2007). However, political culture is often criticized as being static, of ignoring power relations and of being unable to explain change (Thompson *et al*, 1990). For deliberative theory, with its strong focus on deliberative behaviour, the notion of 'political culture' is also problematic since "many accounts of political culture attend to orientations and opinions, only rarely to behavior" (Ballinger, 2006: 347). Thus, the notion of 'political culture' does not sufficiently account for the fact that culture is more than merely attitudes, values, or norms.

In this study, I draw on Kymlicka (1995: 76) and define culture as 'societal culture', "that is, a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational,

religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. […] I call these 'societal cultures' to emphasize that they involve not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions and practices." Although a societal culture may be connected with a 'national culture', the two are not necessarily identical. Societal cultures are often subcultures with distinct institutions and practices which may vary considerably from the 'national culture'. Societal culture is also related to language and linguistic communities. As we shall see below, the object of my study, linguistic communities in Switzerland, fits Kymlicka's concept of societal culture very well: similar to Native North American tribes, or Québécois, Swiss language groups form genuinely societal cultures with distinct practices and institutions. Every linguistic group may also have its own particular way of speaking and arguing. Young (1996: 124) calls this "speech culture". While the concept of societal culture may help to counteract tendencies to associate culture with country or nation, it has been widely criticized for still 'essentializing' culture, that is, to take groups such as linguistic communities as more homogenous units than they really are (Benhabib, 2002; Patten, 2011). While I agree with this criticism, I think that defining culture as "societal cultures" provides us with a benchmark that is ideally suited to a systematic empirical analysis. By contrast, a more encompassing definition of culture (in the form of culture as mere 'practice', for instance) is not only difficult to operationalize in systematic research, it also has a tendency of immunizing 'culture's effects' against criticism. As Rothstein (1996: 145) has noted, if culture is everything, then it is nothing. In other words, if the concept is so rich and encompassing, then finding no effects is practically impossible.

How Culture Matters for Deliberation

Existing theoretical works on culture and deliberation have used a variety of different approaches to study cultural effects of deliberation: while some authors assume culture to be constant within cultural groups (holistic approach), others argue that culture is dependent on context or that culture structures the way actors create their strategies of action. In the following, I will discuss these approaches in turn.

From a 'holistic' perspective, (societal) culture can involve behavioural norms that favour or disfavour deliberation. In his contested "Essay on Discursive Machismo", Gambetta (1998) claims that cultures can either promote or hinder deliberation. He identifies two ideal-typical societies that differ in beliefs about the structure of human knowledge. In an "indexical" or "Claro!" culture, people have "strong opinions on virtually everything from the outset" (Hirschman 1986, quoted in Gambetta, 1998: 20). A "Claro!" culture is therefore "completely antithetic to turn taking, mutual respect, sincerity, truthfulness and everything that contributes to successful deliberation" (Sass, 2006: 2). According to Gambetta, Southern European and Latin American countries are prime examples of a "Claro!" culture. Duchesne and Haegel (2010) present some preliminary empirical evidence that a "Claro!" culture may also apply to French speakers. On the other hand, in "analytical" cultures,

people take time to listen to each other, exchange arguments and reflect on the topic discussed. "Analytical" cultures therefore provide a better deliberative environment. According to Gambetta, Nordic, Germanic, and Anglo-Saxon countries are prime examples of an "analytical" culture.

In recent years, a holistic notion of deliberative cultures has also become increasingly popular in the study of non-Western forms of deliberation. Drawing from Gambetta, Min (2009b: 445; 2014), suggests that East Asian societies such as Korea, Japan, China, Singapore and Taiwan may also have "holistic philosophical traditions" (where knowledge is assumed to be "indexical") that run counter to the norms of deliberation. In order to investigate cultural differences in deliberation Min (2009a) conducted an experiment comparing American and Korean students. He found that culture affected deliberation: compared to Korean students, American students liked deliberation more and used more reasoned arguments. Moreover, American discussion groups also had higher rates of participation equality.

In recent years, however, the holistic cultural approach to deliberation has come under attack. In a critique of Gambetta's argument, Sass (2006) claims that the deliberative culture of a society is not fixed but dependent on context. Discursive machismo or any other speaking style is therefore deployed when people find themselves in a particular context. In other words, it may not be a holistic culture that structures the way people deliberate but institutional (and other contextual) incentives that drive a particular "speech culture" in a specific situation (see also Sass and Dryzek, 2013). Indeed, empirical research shows that the quality of deliberation is strongly tied to institutional incentives and issue type. Comparing Switzerland and Germany, Bächtiger and Hangartner (2010) demonstrate that a holistic conception of national political culture does not seem to affect the quality of discourse. From the perspective of such a contextual approach, "speech cultures" vary according to institutional incentives and issue type rather than the holistic cultural traits of societies or nations. In a similar vein, Rao and Sanyal (2010) also argue that we should not view culture in 'holistic' terms. However, they approach culture in a different way. According to Swidler (1986: 273), they argue that culture should be seen as "a repertoire or 'tool kit' of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 'strategies of action'." In the words of Rao and Sanyal (2010: 169): "Culture therefore is not, as we are often told, a primordially fixed, historically endowed, explanatory variable that is highly resistant to change. It is a relational, communicative process […]."

In the context of this empirical study, it is not possible to explore the full range of cultural approaches. I will not explore whether cultures influence the way actors formulate their strategies (e.g. Swidler, 1986). To do so, one would have to look into individual rationales and motivations which is not possible in the context of this study. What I can explore, however, is whether different cultural and linguistic groups have a different style of deliberation (as anticipated by a holistic approach); or whether different cultural and linguistic groups adapt their speech culture to suit specific institutional situations (different legislative arenas such as public vs. non-public settings or first vs.

second chambers) and topics under discussion (as anticipated by a contextual approach).

With regard to different linguistic groups in Switzerland, I propose the following prediction regarding deliberative behaviour for a holistic or 'Gambetta'-type approach:

> **Prediction 1 (Gambetta Hypothesis):** Different cultural and linguistic groups favour a different style of deliberation. Transferring Gambetta's argument to Switzerland, the Latin language groups - the Italian, French and Romansh speakers - should be less inclined to a deliberative mode of decision-making, i.e. we should see a decrease in the relevant indicators of deliberation (such as respect, justification or constructive politics; see below).

Regarding the adaptation to institutional situations (here, different legislative arenas), my second prediction for deliberative behaviour is as follows:

> **Prediction 2 (Institutional Hypothesis):** Cultural groups adapt their speech culture to suit specific institutional situations and topics under discussion. Thus, (societal) cultures *per se* have no effect on relevant indicators of deliberation, while institutional arrangements and issue type do have an effect.

At first glance, these two predictions seem mutually incompatible. However, they could be complementary in that both culture *and* institutions affect deliberative behaviour.

Group Composition

Existing cultural approaches neglect one essential factor which psychologists deem crucial for individual behaviour: group composition. According to psychologists, group composition and dynamics may influence how culture plays out. Since deliberation normally takes place in groups, Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2007) identify the group as an important unit of analysis. In the same vein, Kanter (1977) has stressed the importance of proportion, or the relative numbers of socially and culturally different people in a group, on interaction dynamics in this group. In an experimental study, Karpowitz et al. (2012) find that the gender and race composition of a group shape the individual decision much more than the individual's own gender. In combination with an unanimous decision rule, a high proportion of women helped to create group processes favorable to deliberative ideals. In line with this finding, I expect that linguistic groups may adapt their speech cultures to different group compositions. Compared to gender or race, however, language is not a visible group characteristic. But language is audible which means that the linguistic composition of a group can still matter. For the purpose of this study, linguistic group composition is taken into account. Following Kanter (1977), group composition is operationalized as a minority context, measured as the proportion of minority languages in Switzerland, namely the portion of French, Italian, and Romansh speakers. Given the absence of clear-cut

theoretical predictions for group composition and the deliberative behaviour of linguistic groups, I refrain from formulating a directional hypothesis but simply explore relevant variations empirically.

> **Prediction 3 (Group Composition Hypothesis):** The speech culture of linguistic groups varies according to their group composition. In concrete, I expect that the higher the proportion of linguistic minority groups in the discussion group, the more the speech culture of these linguistic minority groups will influence the speech culture of the entire group. Thus, I expect that a higher proportion of linguistic minorities (French, Italian and Romansh speakers) will exhibit an influence on the quality of discussion of the whole group.

Having outlined both different cultural approaches and a number of expectations connecting culture to deliberation, the next section will outline the various deliberative standards and clarify which standards are relevant to the different cultural approaches.

Deliberative Standards and Cultural Approaches

In current deliberative theory, there are two versions of deliberation: classic and expanded (see Bächtiger *et al*, 2010a; Mansbridge *et al*, 2010). Classic deliberation is rooted in the Habermasian theory of communicative action. In this view, deliberation entails unconstrained participation, extensive justification of positions with a focus on the common good, reflexivity in the form of weighing arguments and positions with respect, and a willingness to yield to the force of the better argument. The goal of such discourse is to find a rational consensus (Bächtiger *et al*, 2010a). Gambetta's distinction between "Claro!" and "analytical" cultures draws on this classic approach. "Analytical" cultures would have a high score based on these standards, whereas "Claro!" cultures would obtain a low score. Following Gambetta (1998), another indicator of a classic understanding of deliberative quality needs to be considered, and that is questioning. The requirement that actors can question arguments is one of the key elements of a deliberative exchange in Habermas's conception of the ideal speech situation. As Parkinson (2007: 375) puts it, "deliberative democrats place great emphasis on the act of publicly defending one's plans and actions in the face of rigorous questioning. It is a highly rationalist ideal of democracy […]." According to Gambetta, informational and critical questions are elements of communication which "Claro!" people would only very rarely ask since they do not want to appear ignorant.

The classic conception of deliberation has been challenged by critics such as Sanders (1997) and Young (1996). They point out that such a conception can be exclusionary to disadvantaged groups because idealized forms of deliberation suit only a privileged few. To overcome such constraints, critics suggest expanding the classic conception of deliberation to allow for alternative forms of communication such as storytelling, emotional discourse and rhetoric in deliberation. Empirical evidence shows that storytelling is

indeed widely used to justify arguments (see, e.g. Polletta and Lee, 2006). The relationship of expanded versions of deliberation and Gambetta's distinction is not so straightforward. But following critics of classic deliberation, it is reasonable to expect that disadvantaged cultural groups or linguistic minorities rely on storytelling to clarify their arguments and to provide relevant information. Additionally, stories can be framed in different ways in order to advance claims, for instance in a victimized manner (see Polletta, 2009).

Methodology

In the empirical analysis, I explore cultural variation in the context of linguistic groups in Switzerland. Switzerland is an excellent case for analysing whether linguistic speech cultures affect deliberation as it is a multicultural state with four national languages, German, French, Italian and Romansh. The German speakers form a majority (about 72 percent), while the other linguistic groups form minorities.[1] The linguistic groups are all tied to the same political system and share a commitment to the basic political institutions (Linder, 2005). Thus, Switzerland is an example of "multiculturalism within a common institutional framework" (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008: 13).[2] However, language is not the only varying characteristic among the cultural groups. The language groups also differ in their political preferences. This results in different voting behaviour with regard to federalism, social welfare and foreign affairs (Knüsel, 1994; Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008). Linder et al. (2008) conclude from these differences, that the language regions have, what Kymlicka (1995) calls, different societal cultures. As Hangartner (2009) demonstrates, different political preferences between German and French speakers persist even when comparing districts which are directly adjacent to linguistic borders.

The language groups also have distinct cultural institutions as well as different values. Each language region has its own media landscape. Since the language groups do not subscribe to television, radio or press from other language regions the public sphere is segmented along linguistic lines. Moreover, there are limited interchanges between the language groups and people generally have low language skills in other national languages (Kriesi *et al*, 1996). Thus, assessing the language groups in Switzerland as different cultural entities captures more than merely linguistic differences. The language groups can be clearly identified as distinct cultural entities with different values, political preferences, media systems and historical backgrounds. By analysing speech cultures in Switzerland, we therefore capture more than just language differences; we actually capture real differences in culture. This is fully in line with Kymlicka's (1995: 76) definition of societal cultures which are "based on a shared language."

[1] In 2000, the Swiss population (foreigners not included) consisted of 72.5 percent Swiss-German citizens, 21 percent French speaking, 4.3 percent Italian speaking and 0.6 percent Romansh speaking citizens (Volkszählung, 2000).
[2] There are of course other cleavages in Switzerland such as religion, class, and urban/rural.

In this study, I analyze Swiss parliamentary debates in both the first and second chambers as well as in the respective committees.[3] While both chambers have equal competencies, the two chambers differ with regard to size and party composition. The second chamber (46 members) is much smaller than the first chamber (200 members) and its party composition is more homogeneous. Prior to the plenary debates, parliamentary acts are discussed at length in the respective committees where the debates are confidential, thus providing incentives for more serious deliberation (Elster, 1998).

I focus on parliamentary debates for the following reasons: first, parliaments represent an important arena for deliberation (Habermas, 1992) and are a place where binding decisions are made. Second, as the linguistic groups with their distinct cultures are assembled in the same institution, we can explore the effects of cultural variation in an unbiased manner by maintaining a constant institutional setting. Third, there are no other arenas or institutions where all language groups are present and interact with each other in the four national languages.[4] In the civic sphere, these conditions are rarely (if ever) met. Thus, 'true' multilingual deliberation in Switzerland only occurs at the elite level.

I analyze two debates on linguistic policies that touch upon vital interests of linguistic groups: the language article of the 1990s (*Sprachenartikel*) and the language bill of the 2000s (*Sprachengesetz*). These two debates are the only major debates on linguistic policy that have taken place since 1938 when Romansh was recognized as a national language. Most importantly, the language debates are less polarized issues and partisan attitudes are not very marked, which provides a rare constellation in real world politics where deliberation becomes a more extended logic of action (see Steiner *et al*, 2004). Language debates in Switzerland, thus, seem to provide a very favourable context for exploring potential variations in speech cultures. The disadvantage is that in the context of language debates, the deliberative behaviour of linguistic minorities may not only reflect culture but also minority status. If linguistic minorities are less deliberative in this context, then it is difficult to say whether this is an effect of different speech cultures or whether it is a defensive strategy of minorities trying to protect their interests.

I address this problem in two ways: on the one hand, I benefit from cultural variation within the three linguistic minorities. In this regard, Romansh speakers may not truly qualify as "Claristas" in Gambetta's conception. The Romansh group is much closer to the German culture than French or Italian speakers since most Romansh people are bilingual, having German as their second mother tongue. Thus, if there is variation in deliberative behaviour between Romansh and French or Italian speakers, then we are in a position to distinguish between culture and minority status. On the other hand, I focus on a contrasting debate, the labour law revision (*Arbeitsgesetz*), a polarized issue

[3] Only discussions in first chamber plenary debates are translated simultaneously.
[4] The speeches are coded in its original language since the author is fluent in all four national languages. The coding was done by the author.

in which the interests of the linguistic groups are not involved and in which partisan attitudes play a crucial role.

Language Article

The goal of the new language article was to improve the position of the Romansh language as well as to improve mutual understanding and communication among the different language groups in Switzerland. Two principles, namely the territoriality principle and the freedom of language, were highly controversial in the parliamentary debates. By weakening the territoriality principle, Romansh speakers would obtain more flexibility to maintain their language. However, French- and Italian-speaking MPs argued that weakening the territoriality principle would be dangerous. They feared that freedom of language would enable German speakers to ask for German schools in the French- or Italian-speaking parts. The different opinions on the two principles could finally be settled with a compromise proposal in which neither of the two principles was mentioned and Romansh became an official language for communication with Romansh people. The compromise found approval in the first chamber with 152-19 votes and in the second chamber with 43-0 votes.

Language Bill

The goal of the Language Bill was to secure national cohesion as well as communication between the different linguistic groups. Article 15, regulating language instruction in school, was one of the most disputed articles. The first chamber decided in favour of prioritizing a national language, rather than English, as the first foreign language in school. The second chamber, however, supported a proposal of the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education. This proposal implied that, of the two foreign languages that should be learned in school, at least one should be a national language, yet the cantons should be free to decide whether it is taught as the first language. In order to avoid a language dispute between the linguistic communities, a compromise solution was finally approved. It required that students should be competent in the basics of two foreign languages and that at least one of them should be a national language. The bill passed with 135-56 votes in the first chamber and 39-0 votes in the second chamber.

Labour Law Revision

The goal of the labour law revision in the 1990s aimed at improving the competitiveness of the Swiss economy by relaxing certain labour regulations. The main objective was to establish equality between men and women by abolishing the prohibition of women from working at night and on Sundays. At the same time, the protection of individuals working nights and on Sundays should be improved. Therefore, the government proposed a compensation measure of a 10% time bonus for those working nights and on Sundays. While left-wing deputies supported the governmental proposal, many right-wing deputies opposed the measure. The opposition of right-wing deputies led the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions to collect signatures for a referendum. As a

reaction, right-wing MPs stalled the pursuit of a compromise in Parliament. The bill was rejected with 89-80 votes in the first chamber and 27-6 votes in the second chamber.

Measuring Deliberation

Dependent Variables

For the analysis of the debates, I rely on the 'Discourse Quality Index' (DQI) developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003). The DQI is a quantitative measurement of the quality of discourse that is rooted in the Habermasian theory of communicative action and that received support from deliberative philosophers (e.g. Habermas, 2005). However, the original DQI has a number of deficits which led to its revision (Bächtiger *et al*, 2010b). In addition to rational discourse elements, the updated version of the DQI also includes alternative forms of deliberation such as storytelling.

Empirically, discourse quality is not a unidimensional phenomenon. Put differently, higher justification rationality does not mean a higher level of respect (Steiner *et al*, 2004). I will therefore focus on the individual components of the DQI without aggregating them into a single index. Additionally, several indicators of the DQI will be recoded so that a score of one indicates speech acts that come near to the ideal discourse on a particular indicator. In the following, I will briefly discuss the dependent variables that are used for the statistical analysis. While Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, Table 2 gives an overview of the dependent variables and the predictors.

Respect*:* Respect is one of the crucial and untouched elements of deliberative theory (Mansbridge, 2010). The updated DQI measures respect in two dimensions. First, 'respect toward groups' measures whether the groups that are to be helped are degraded (0), treated neutrally (1), or with explicit respect. Second, 'respect toward demands and counterarguments' measures whether speakers degrade (0), treat neutrally (1), value (2), or agree with positions and counterarguments (3). Both indicators are recoded in order to focus on positive respect levels. Speeches that value groups or demands and counterarguments are assigned a value of one and all others are recoded as zero.

Interactivity*:* Deliberation requires that participants listen to each other and that they engage with one another. Interactivity is captured by the indicator 'reference toward other participants' arguments'. It measures whether discourse participants respond to other participants' arguments.

Level of Justification*:* High deliberative quality requires that speakers give complete justifications for their demands. The indicator distinguishes between five levels of justification: no justification (0), inferior justification where the linkage between reasons and conclusions is incomplete (1), qualified justification where the linkage is complete (2), sophisticated justification

(broad) when at least two completed justifications are provided (3), and sophisticated (in-depth) when the justification is explored in depth. For the analysis, the indicator was recoded so that a score of one is given to sophisticated justifications (broad and in-depth) which mirror ideal discourse on this indicator.

Content of Justification*:* This indicator measures whether arguments are made in terms of narrow constituency or group interests (0), whether there are neutral statements (1), or whether there is a reference to the common good in utilitarian or collective terms (2a) or in terms of the difference principle (2b). The indicator was dichotomized so that appeals to the common good receive a score of one and all other categories receive a score of zero.

Constructive Politics: This indicator refers to the idea that ideal deliberation should arrive at a rational consensus. In this regard, the indicator distinguishes between four levels of constructivity: positional politics (0), alternative proposals (1), consensus and compromise appeals (2), and mediating proposals (3). This indicator is recoded so that speeches with a mediating proposal receive a value of one and all other categories receive a score of zero.

Questioning*:* This dimension is not a category of the original DQI although rigorous questioning is a key element of deliberation. It is an attempt to explore whether Gambetta's (1998) distinction between "Claro!" and "analytical" culture holds empirically. Two variables are coded: clarifying questions refer to questions where participants ask for information or clarification; rhetorical questions refer to questions where participants do not expect answers and use rhetoric. According to Gambetta, "Claristas" are expected to score low on clarifying questions since they do not want to appear ignorant.[5]

Storytelling*:* Following Stromer-Galley (2007), I measure whether participants use personal experiences or specific examples. Since true personal experiences were extremely rare in the debates I analysed, I consider them together with descriptions of the actual situation of linguistic groups. An additional category has been created in order to capture what I define as *victimized stories*. Victimized stories are stories where participants see themselves as victims or use groups as victims in order to bolster their justifications. Minorities can use them as a resource to further enhance awareness of their positions.

[5] Another attempt to capture Gambetta's (1998) "Claro!" and "analytical" cultures is the operationalization of uncertainty. Such an indicator measures whether participants express uncertainty about an issue at hand or if they admit lack of competence. Since the inter-coder reliability on this dimension is low, the results are not included in the empirical assessment.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables

	Mean	SD	N
Explicit respect toward groups	0.10	0.30	1664
Respect toward demands and counterarguments	1.23	0.74	1664
Explicit respect toward demands and counterarguments	0.23	0.42	1664
Interactivity	0.45	0.50	1664
Sophisticated justification	0.32	0.47	1664
Common good orientation	0.20	0.40	1664
Mediating proposals	0.04	0.18	1664
Clarifying questions	0.14	0.35	1664
Rhetorical questions	0.08	0.27	1664
Storytelling	0.12	0.32	1664
Victimized stories	0.13	0.34	187

Several inter-coder reliability tests on the various indicators show that reliability is good to excellent (see Appendix for more details).[6] The ratio of coding agreement (RCA) ranges between 0.790 for level of justification to 0.988 for questioning. Cohen's kappa (k), which controls for inter-coder agreement by chance ranges from 0.657 for constructive politics to 0.940 for questioning.

Predictors

At the individual level, I consider the parliamentarians' language group as the speech culture they belong to, namely German, French, Italian and Romansh.[7] The linguistic groups serve as a proxy for capturing cultural variations in deliberative behaviour. As in existing research on the antecedents of deliberation (e.g. Bächtiger and Hangartner, 2010), I control for various actor characteristics (gender, age and tenure), partisan variables (parliamentary group) and parliamentary roles (chairperson, Federal Councillor). Following psychologists, I focus on group composition with regard to language groups at the contextual level. The variable 'minority' indicates the percentage of non-German speakers present in the different sessions (committee and plenary sessions). Federal Councillors and administrative staff who spoke during the debates were also taken into account when calculating this variable. The variable ranges from 14.3% to 53.8% (with an average of 35%). I control for arena, chamber, and issue at the contextual level. The latter, issue, controls for possible differences between the language article, the language bill and the labour law revision.

[6] The reliability testing involved an independent person fluent in two languages.

[7] The language group the MPs belong to was coded according to the region they electorally represent. Bilingual MPs were coded according to the language they speak most often.

Table 2: Variable Descriptions

Dependent Variables	
Explicit respect toward groups	The indicator *respect toward groups* is recoded as follows in order to focus on positive values: (1) positive respect values, (0) negative and neutral values.
Respect toward demands and counterarguments	An indicator for *respect toward demands and counterarguments*: (0) negative, (1) neutral, (2) positive, (3) agreement.
Explicit respect toward demands and counterarguments	The indicator *respect toward demands and counterarguments* is recoded as follows in order to focus on positive values: (1) agreement and positive respect values, (0) negative and neutral values.
Interactivity	This variable indicates if participants refer to other participants' arguments: (0) no references, (1) reference.
Sophisticated justification	The indicator *justification rationality* is recoded as follows: (1) sophisticated justification broad and in-depth, (0) no, inferior and qualified justifications.
Common good orientation	An indicator for *common good orientation*: (1) common good in utilitarian terms and in terms of the difference principle, (0) group interests and neutral statements.
Mediating proposals	The indicator *constructive politics* is recoded as follows: (1) mediating proposals, (0) positional politics, alternative proposals and consensus appeals.
Clarifying questions	This variable indicates if participants ask knowledge-based questions.
Rhetorical questions	This variable indicates if participants make use of rhetorical questions.
Storytelling	Indicates if participants make use of storytelling by referring to personal experiences and/or cantonal situation.
Victimized stories	Dummy variable coded 1 for stories where participants see themselves as victims or use groups as victims.
Independent Variables	
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS	
Language group	4 dummy variables indicating a participants' language group: French, Italian and Romansh speakers. German speakers are the reference category.
Gender	Dummy variable coded 1 for women.
Age	Indicates the participant's age; adjusted for the year of the debate and centred around the mean.
Tenure	Indicates the years in parliament (first and/or second

	chamber; adjusted for the year of the debate and centred around the mean.
Party affiliation	The Swiss parliament is divided into parliamentary groups that comprise members of the same party or parties with similar ideologies. The parliamentary group membership of the participants is indicated by 7 dummy variables: - Free Democrats*: Freisinnig-demokratische Fraktion*, [R°/RL*] is the reference category - Christian Democrats: *Christlichdemokratische Fraktion* [C] (CVP) - Social Democrats: *Sozialdemokratische Fraktion* [S] (SP) - Swiss People's Party: *Fraktion der Schweizerischen Volkspartei* [V] (SVP) - Green Group: *Grüne Fraktion* [G] (Greens) - Evangelicals and Liberals: EVP-EDU Fraktion [E*] is consolidated with the *LdU/EVP Fraktion* [U°] and the *Liberale Fraktion* [L°] (EDU/EVP/ LIB/LDU) - Right Wing: *Fraktion der Autopartei* [A°] is consolidated with the *Fraktion der Schweizer Demokraten und Lega* [D°] (AP/ LEGA) *47th legislative period (2003-2007); °44th legislative period (1992-1995)
Chairperson	Dummy coded 1 for chairperson in respective chamber or committee.
Federal Councillor	Dummy variable coded 1 for Federal Councillors.
CONTEXT CHARACTERISTICS	
Minorities	This variable indicates the percentage of French, Italian and Romansh speakers in the respective debate.
Arena	Indicates whether the debate is public (0) or non-public (1).
Chamber	Indicates whether the debate takes place in the first chamber (0) or in the second chamber (1).
Issue	Three dummy variables indicating the issue of the debate: Language Bill, Labour Law Revision. The reference category is the Language Article.

Statistical Analysis

The data constitute a multilevel structure: 1664 speech acts are nested in 47 committee and plenary debates. Due to this hierarchical data structure, multilevel analysis is the appropriate statistical tool (see Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). Since I assume that the members of the language groups behave differently in the debates, I calculated two-level varying intercept models. For the dichotomized respect indicators I ran multilevel logit models and for *respect toward demands and counterarguments* I estimated a multilevel normal linear model. Calculations based on multilevel logit models were also run for *justification rationality, common good orientation, constructive*

politics, *questioning* and *storytelling*. In cases where the indicator has a skewed distribution, such as *mediating proposals*, I ran a multilevel gompit model. Note that the multilevel logit/gompit models constrain the variance at the lowest level (in this instance, speech acts) in order to identify the parameters. All computations were done using Bates, Maechler, and Dai's (2008) lme4 package for R. The models were estimated with *lmer*. The linear model was estimated using restricted maximum likelihood (REML).

I have run a number of robustness checks. First, I have re-checked the results by focusing on the three issues separately. Results do not change. Second, I also ran linear regressions and clustered standard errors (at the level of committee and plenary sessions) for all the models. Again, the results do not differ from the multilevel estimates.

Results

The statistical analyses shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5 indicate that there are some significant effects of linguistic groups on deliberative indicators. With regard to the French-speaking MPs, the results reveal that they make fewer references to other participants' arguments than their German-speaking counterparts (model 4). Furthermore, concerning the content of justification, the French-speaking MPs have a statistically significant negative effect on common good orientation (model 6). This means that, compared to the German-speaking MPs, the French-speaking MPs make their appeals in terms of narrow group or constituency interests and less in terms of the common good. Moreover, compared to German speakers, French-speaking MPs tell more stories in which they see themselves or their groups as victims (e.g. stories about a particular experience where they felt discriminated; model 11).

Interestingly, there are only two effects for *Italian-speaking MPs*. First, and similar to French speakers, there is a statistically positive effect for victimized stories. Second, there is an effect on mediating proposals (model 7): Italian-speaking MPs introduce fewer mediating proposals than their German-speaking counterparts. Since this is a gompit model, a value of zero is predicted, i.e. the absence of an appeal to the common good, and therefore the statistically significant effect in model 7 is positive.

A slightly different pattern occurs for the *Romansh-speaking MPs*. Compared to German-speaking MPs, the results reveal that Romansh speakers show less respect toward groups (model 1) as well as toward demands and counterarguments (model 2, 3). This is a particularly interesting result, since Romansh speakers may not truly qualify as "Claristas". As mentioned before, Romansh speakers are more closely attached to German culture than French or Italian speakers. Thus, it may be indeed their minority status rather than group culture that drives these negative results for respect. Finally, there is, similar to the French- and Italian-speaking MPs, a statistically significant positive effect for telling stories of victimization (model 11) which suggests that linguistic minorities used stories instrumentally and in an empathic way. This result further corroborates the interpretation that minority status rather than speech

cultures are the source of the (few) differences in deliberative behaviour between linguistic minorities and German speakers.

However, there are no statistically significant effects for linguistic groups on sophisticated justification, clarifying questions and rhetorical questions. Contrary to my expectations, there is also no significant effect for French, Italian and Romansh speakers on storytelling (even though the effects are all positive, as expected; model 10). Overall, the findings so far suggest that the effects of a posited holistic societal culture on deliberative indicators are rather mixed and that it is rather institutions that shape the deliberative practice and performance of parliamentary actors.

On the contextual level, there are some interesting results for *group composition,* which is operationalized as a minority context and measured as the proportion of minority languages composed of French, Italian and Romansh speakers. The results reveal that group composition is negatively associated with respect toward groups (model 1) and respect toward demands and counterarguments (model 2). Moreover, group composition is also negatively associated with common good orientation (model 6) and clarifying questions (model 8). This means, for instance, that the higher the proportion of linguistic minorities in the committee and parliamentary debates, the lower the respect levels and orientation to the common good. The interpretation of this result is tricky: on the one hand, one could argue that as soon as the linguistic groups get a better standing, their "Claro"-style of political communication comes to the fore; on the other hand, one can plausibly argue that if the share of minorities increases, they become more forceful defenders of their interests (as is reflected in the common good and respect measure). Nonetheless, the findings suggest that varying compositions of cultural groups influence the speech culture of the entire decision group. Even though all substantive effects are small, the results underline the importance of group factors for deliberative quality.

I have also probed for interaction effects, testing whether linguistic minorities behave differently in the context of specific issues (labour law vs. language debates) and specific institutions (non-publicity and second chambers). But no such interaction effects could be identified, which means that the deliberative behaviour of linguistic minorities does not differ from German speakers across different contexts.

Table 3: Antecedents of Respect

	Model 1: Explicit Respect Toward Groups	*Model 2: Respect Demands and Counter-arguments*	*Model 3: Explicit Respect Demands and Counterarguments*	*Model 4: Interactivity*
Fixed Effects				
Individual Characteristics				
Constant	0.55	1.81**	0.47	0.58
	(0.69)	(0.20)	(0.68)	(0.46)
French Speakers	-0.28	-0.05	-0.20	**-0.28***
	(0.23)	(0.05)	(0.17)	**(0.14)**
Italian Speakers	-0.31	0.09	0.11	-0.12
	(0.35)	(0.07)	(0.24)	(0.20)
Romansh Speakers	**-1.83****	**-0.19***	**-0.77***	-0.01
	(0.65)	**(0.09)**	**(0.33)**	(0.26)
Gender	0.05	0.08+	0.25	0.07
	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.14)
Age	0.01	-0.00+	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Tenure	-0.01	0.01*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)
CVP	0.43	0.08	0.27	-0.13
	(0.27)	(0.05)	(0.19)	(0.15)
SP	0.40	-0.07	0.06	0.06
	(0.29)	(0.06)	(0.20)	(0.17)
SVP	-0.05	-0.09	-0.13	-0.06
	(0.39)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.19)
Greens	-0.55	-0.15	-0.14	0.01
	(0.61)	(0.10)	(0.37)	(0.30)
EDU/EVP/LIB/LDU	1.07**	-0.09	-0.28	-0.03
	(0.32)	(0.08)	(0.28)	(0.22)
AP/LEGA	0.21	-0.53**	-2.22*	-0.51
	(0.62)	(0.16)	(1.07)	(0.48)
Chairperson	-0.63+	-0.25**	-1.45**	-0.24
	(0.35)	(0.05)	(0.26)	(0.16)
Federal Councillor	0.69+	0.39**	0.94**	1.10**
	(0.37)	(0.09)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Contextual Characteristics				
Minorities	**-0.04***	**-0.01***	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	**(0.01)**	(0.02)	(0.01)
Non-public Arena	-0.90**	0.05	-0.04	0.02
	(0.30)	(0.09)	(0.30)	(0.20)
Second Chamber	0.13	0.16*	0.30	0.15
	(0.25)	(0.07)	(0.24)	(0.16)
Language Law	-1.63**	-0.39**	-1.02**	-0.39+
	(0.34)	(0.09)	(0.32)	(0.21)
Labour Law	-1.36**	-0.59**	-1.43**	-0.59*
	(0.37)	(0.11)	(0.37)	(0.25)
Variance Components				
Debate Level	0.18	0.03	0.31	0.09
	(0.43)	(0.17)	(0.56)	(0.30)
Speaker Level		0.48		
		(0.69)		
AIC	987.7	3650	1657	2273
Log Likelihood	-472.8	-1803	-807.6	-1115
Number of Speech Acts	$N_i = 1664$	$N_i = 1664$	$N_i = 1664$	$N_i = 1664$
Number of Debates	$N_j = 47$	$N_j = 47$	$N_j = 47$	$N_j = 47$
Method	Logit	Linear	Logit	Logit

Notes: Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.10$

Table 4: Antecedents of Justification and Constructive Politics

	Model 5: Sophisticated Justification	*Model 6: Common Good Orientation*	*Model 7: Mediating Proposals*
Fixed Effects			
Individual Characteristics			
Constant	2.12*	1.00+	1.28**
	(0.83)	(0.59)	(0.30)
French Speakers	0.06	**-0.48****	-0.10
	(0.17)	**(0.18)**	(0.11)
Italian Speakers	0.15	-0.18	**0.40+**
	(0.25)	(0.25)	**(0.21)**
Romansh Speakers	0.08	-0.54	0.04
	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.21)
Gender	0.25	0.18	-0.10
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	0.01+
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Tenure	-0.02	0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
CVP	-0.29	0.23	0.03
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.12)
SP	-0.18	0.18	0.51**
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.15)
SVP	-0.22	-0.37	0.18
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.16)
Greens	0.43	0.05	0.39
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.29)
EDU/EVP/LIB/LDU	-0.39	0.23	0.33+
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.19)
AP/LEGA	-1.66**	-0.63	0.06
	(0.54)	(0.57)	(0.36)
Chairperson	-1.96**	-0.79**	0.13
	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.13)
Federal Councillor	0.07	0.96**	-0.18
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.20)
Contextual Characteristics			
Minorities	-0.00	**-0.03+**	-0.00
	(0.02)	**(0.02)**	(0.01)
Non-public Arena	-2.10**	-1.29**	-0.33*
	(0.36)	(0.25)	(0.13)
Second Chamber	-0.25	-0.23	0.02
	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.10)
Language Law	-2.34**	-0.57*	0.43**
	(0.40)	(0.27)	(0.15)
Labour Law	-0.79+	-1.12**	-0.01
	(0.42)	(0.32)	(0.16)
Variance Components			
Debate Level	0.54	0.15	0.00
	(0.74)	(0.39)	(0.00)
AIC	1557	1529	505.9
Log Likelihood	-757.6	-743.3	-232
Number of Speech Acts	$N_i = 1664$	$N_i = 1664$	$N_i = 1664$
Number of Debates	$N_i = 47$	$N_i = 47$	$N_i = 47$
Method	Logit	Logit	Gompit

Notes: Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.10$

Table 5: Antecedents of Questioning and Storytelling

	Model 8: Clarifying Questions	*Model 9: Rhetorical Questions*	*Model 10: Storytelling*	*Model11: Victimized Stories*[a]
Fixed Effects				
Individual Characteristics				
Constant	-2.17**	-0.15	-0.23	-6.36**
	(0.64)	(0.68)	(0.89)	(2.19)
French Speakers	0.26	0.34	0.15	**2.88****
	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.21)	**(0.95)**
Italian Speakers	0.20	0.08	0.16	**3.56****
	(0.30)	(0.36)	(0.29)	**(1.10)**
Romansh Speakers	-0.16	-0.44	0.14	**2.79****
	(0.41)	(0.46)	(0.37)	**(1.05)**
Gender	-0.13	-0.82**	-0.45*	-1.45
	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(1.07)
Age	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.04
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)
Tenure	0.01	-0.00	-0.02	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)
CVP	-0.09	-0.78*	-0.03	-1.34
	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.24)	(0.88)
SP	-0.36	-0.12	0.15	0.67
	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.94)
SVP	-0.20	0.03	-0.08	-1.13
	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(1.31)
Greens	0.67	-0.38	-0.16	
	(0.42)	(0.55)	(0.45)	
EDU/EVP/LIB/LDU	-0.05	-0.19	-0.54	-0.63
	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(1.37)
AP/LEGA	1.71**	-0.12	0.21	-1.55
	(0.57)	(0.62)	(0.57)	(1.52)
Chairperson	-0.03	-2.82**	-1.58**	-0.12
	(0.22)	(1.04)	(0.46)	(1.51)
Federal Councillor	-0.98+	0.00	-0.65	
	(0.55)	(0.43)	(0.43)	
Contextual Characteristics				
Minorities	**-0.04****	-0.01	-0.02	0.08
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Non-public Arena	1.92**	-1.40**	-0.72+	-0.42
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.97)
Second Chamber	0.54**	-0.19	-0.44	0.02
	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.67)
Language Law	0.15	-0.77*	-0.26	-0.98
	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.40)	(1.00)
Labour Law	-0.30	-1.23**	-1.29**	1.48
	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.47)	(1.09)
Variance Components				
Debate Level	0.05	0.06	0.50	0.00
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.70)	(0.00)
AIC	1275	827.7	1121	140.7
Log Likelihood	-616.5	-392.8	-539.3	-51.35
Number of Speech Acts	$N_i = 1664$	$N_i = 1664$	$N_i = 1664$	$N_i = 187$
Number of Debates	$N_i = 47$	$N_i = 47$	$N_i = 47$	$N_i = 37$
Method	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit

Notes: Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.10$

[a] Greens and Federal Councillor are perfectly predicted and therefore excluded.

As far as the control variables at the individual level are concerned, the role of chairperson is negatively associated with classic deliberative standards such as respect, justification rationality and common good orientation. This is not surprising since a chairperson is charged with ensuring debates run smoothly and enforcing discipline if required. Federal Councillors are positively associated with classic deliberative standards as they are interested in bringing their bills successfully through the parliament and therefore engage in more respectful deliberation. Other actor characteristics such as party variables and age have relatively modest effects, while tenure has a positive effect, at least for the respect indicators. However, there is an unexpected result for women with regard to storytelling: female MPs make less use of storytelling than their male counterparts. This tends to contradict the claims of feminist authors that storytelling is a feminine means of expression (e.g. Sanders, 1997; Young, 1996).

For the controls at the contextual level, the results reveal that in particular the specific issues under discussion matter. Compared to debates on the language article, classic deliberative standards such as respect, justification rationality or common good orientation were lower in the debates on the language bill or in the more polarized debates on the labour law revision. Thus, issues that are less polarized, such as the language article, are conducive to more respectful and constructive decision-making (see Steiner *et al*, 2004). Moreover, as found by Steiner et al. (2004), the results also reveal that second chambers enhance respectful behaviour of MPs (model 2), and that non-public arenas, such as committee debates, are negatively associated with sophisticated justifications and common good orientation. Additionally, more clarifying questions are asked in non-public debates in which deputies can be more honest and pose questions which reveal their lack of knowledge without losing face (Chambers, 2005; Steiner *et al*, 2004)

To summarize, the cultural variables suggest that a holistic conception of culture does not really matter. Respect, justification rationality, common good orientation, constructive politics, questioning and storytelling are not attributes of deep-seated linguistic speech cultures, rather speech cultures are highly context-driven. What matters in particular is the group context: group composition is in most cases negatively associated with classic standards of deliberation, as well as with clarifying questions.

Conclusion

In this article, I have explored how culture works for deliberation in the context of parliamentary deliberation. Does it work in a holistic way, assuming culture as a constant? Or, does culture work in a contextual fashion, assuming adaptive rationality of actors to different contexts? Or, do different compositions of cultural groups influence the speech culture of the entire discussion group? These questions were evaluated by making the controversial initial assumption that linguistic groups in Switzerland are cultural entities as well as by linking speech acts of linguistic groups to a broad variety of

deliberative standards, ranging from justification rationality to storytelling. More precisely, the study investigated whether linguistic groups in the committee and plenary debates of the Swiss parliament differ in their deliberative behaviour. The study, however, shows that linguistic groups do not differ much in their deliberative behaviour and that language groups only occasionally produce systematic variation on the various deliberative indicators. Thus, the results reveal that culture in its 'holistic' and 'Gambetta-style' version does not matter but that speech culture is a highly contextual (and institutionally-driven) phenomenon. Besides, and in line with a prominent new line in political psychology (Karpowitz et al., 2012) my findings show that group composition (proportion of minority-language speakers) affects several deliberative indicators such as respect, common good orientation and clarifying questions. The practical implication of these results is that deliberative quality does not seem to be strongly tied to deeply ingrained speech cultures, but adapts itself to different institutional and group contexts. Consequently, its translatability and transferability seems greater than many authors have presumed.

Of course, this study is not without limitations. First, the study is limited to political elites since there are no other forums in Switzerland where all language groups come together to discuss political issues. Therefore, the focus of the empirical study lies on experienced deliberators. Put differently, the importance of an holistic approach may be underestimated in a setting where institutional rules trump cultural scripts. As such, the results cannot be generalized beyond elite deliberation. Nonetheless, my results underline the importance of institutional factors in shaping deliberative behaviour, which is an important result giving the fact that most deliberative events (also among citizens) usually occur in a highly structured (and institutionalised) setting. Finally, the study compared only cultural groups within a country and not cultures of different countries. However, I consider this as a difficult endeavour since in a cross-national study of two or more countries with differing institutions, it is almost impossible to determine whether differences in deliberative behaviour are due to institutional or cultural effects. Nonetheless, and similar to experimental studies in economics, future studies are well advised to analyse how deliberative methods and ideals play out in very different cultural contexts.

Overall, by empirically challenging the popular conception (and myth) of 'holistic' speech cultures, the study paves the way for novel ways of conceptualizing deliberative cultures. The finding that societal cultures have no effect certainly does not mean that culture does not matter. Anthropological approaches, in combination with ethnographic methods, might reveal a very different picture. In this regard, Sass and Dryzek (2013) provide some intriguing illustrations how basic societal and political contexts can lead to very different interpretations of 'similar' deliberative acts. And they likewise emphasize the frequent contestatory nature of societal cultures, prohibiting any attempts at 'essentializing' them. While this study is one of the first to

empirically demonstrate the irrelevance of 'essentialized' notions of culture in the study of deliberation, the study of deliberative cultures is yet to begin.

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Appendix

Table 6: Inter-coder Agreement per Category

	RCA	Kappa	s.e.	Spearman	Alpha
Level of justification	0.790	0.720	0.064**	0.893**	0.944
Content of justification	0.889	0.809	0.094**	0.874**	0.933
Constructive politics	0.877	0.657	0.148**		
Respect toward groups	0.926	0.820	0.133**	0.839**	0.912
Respect toward demands	0.889	0.789	0.106**	0.837**	0.911
Interactivity	0.889	0.820	0.087**		
Storytelling	0.951	0.858	0.152**		
Victimized stories	0.963	0.900	0.145**		
Information questions	0.988	0.940	0.217**		
Rhetorical questions	0.988	0.940	0.217**		

N=81, **p<0.01

Table 7: Speakers

	Language Article	Language Law	Labor Law	Total (all 3 debates)*
German speakers	37	37	42	98
French speakers	23	16	19	53
Italian speakers	9	7	1	15
Romansh speakers	5	2	2	6

*Same speakers can appear in all three debates

Table 8: Speeches by Language Groups

	Language Article	Language Law	Labor Law	Total (all 3 debates)
German speakers	348	348	259	955
French speakers	201	164	102	467
Italian speakers	77	76	7	160
Romansh speakers	66	3	13	82
	692	591	381	1664