Journal of Public Deliberation

Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 8

12-28-2010

Deliberative Democracy and Citizenship: In Search of the Efficacy Effect

Tina Nabatchi
Maxwell School. Syracuse University, tnabatch@maxwell.syr.edu

Deliberative Democracy and Citizenship: In Search of the Efficacy Effect

Abstract

Enthusiasm for deliberative democracy has grown in recent years, as many believe that it can create better citizens generally, and particularly increase their perceptions of political efficacy. Although the "efficacy effect" is frequently touted as a rationale for engaging in deliberative processes, there is little empirical research on the subject. This study examines the impact on perceptions of internal and external political efficacy of participation in one manifestation of a deliberative democracy process, the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting. Using quasi-experimental, longitudinal survey data, the study finds partial support for the claim that deliberative democracy produces the efficacy effect. Implications of the findings and directions for future research are discussed.

Keywords

Deliberative Democracy, Political Efficacy, Citizenship

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute and a grant from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP: IN SEARCH OF THE EFFICACY EFFECT

Tina Nabatchi, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor, Department of Public Administration
Faculty Research Associate, PARCC
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
400F Eggers Hall
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY 13244
(315) 443-8994 (office)
tnabatch@maxwell.syr.edu

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP: IN SEARCH OF THE EFFICACY EFFECT

ABSTRACT

Enthusiasm for deliberative democracy has grown in recent years, as many believe that it can create better citizens generally, and particularly increase their perceptions of political efficacy. Although the "efficacy effect" is frequently touted as a rationale for engaging in deliberative processes, there is little empirical research on the subject. This study examines the impact on perceptions of internal and external political efficacy of participation in one manifestation of a deliberative democracy process, the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting. Using quasi-experimental survey data collected from subjects at several different points in time, the study finds partial support for the claim that deliberative democracy produces the efficacy effect. Implications of the findings and directions for future research are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

Deliberative democracy seeks to infuse government decision making with the reasoned discussion and collective judgment of citizens (Chambers 2003; Cunningham 2002; Elster 1998; Gutmann and Thompson 2004). In recent decades, deliberative democracy has resurged in popularity in the United States and in other Western nations. The increased interest is, in part, a function of the claim that deliberative democracy can create "better citizens" by fostering and improving civic attitudes and behaviors, such as political sophistication, interest, participation, trust, respect, empathy, and sociotropism or public spiritedness (Luskin and Fishkin 2003; Mansbridge 1995). One of the most important citizenship characteristics thought to be developed by democratic participation is political efficacy (Pateman 1970), defined as the "feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process" (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954: 187). Although the "efficacy effect" is frequently touted as a rationale for engaging in deliberative processes, there is little empirical research on the subject.

This study seeks to fill part of this research gap by examining the impact on political efficacy of participation in one manifestation of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting, a deliberative democracy process that enables large groups of citizens to deliberate about important community issues and provide recommendations to government officials. The study uses quasi-experimental, longitudinal survey data to address three questions: Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy before participation in the Town Meeting? Do participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting? If participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting, do those effects last over time?

The article first explores the concept of political efficacy and examines its supposed decline in the United States. The second section defines deliberative democracy and explains how deliberative participation is theorized to affect the skills and dispositions of citizenship generally and political efficacy specifically. It also briefly examines previous research on the relationship between deliberation and political efficacy. The third section turns to methodology, discussing the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting, the research design, variable construction, and analytic methods. The results of the study are presented in the fourth section, and the article concludes with a discussion of the implications and directions for future research.

THE DECLINE OF POLITCAL EFFICACY

Many scholars claim that the United States and other western nations are experiencing a "citizenship deficit" or a broad erosion of the skills and dispositions of citizenship among the general public (Frantzich 2005; Macedo et. al 2005; Nabatchi 2010; Putnam 2000; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). Indicators of this decline are varied and numerous, including voter turnout, political participation, activity, and knowledge, engagement in campaign activities, trust in government, and associational memberships among others. A review of these indicators has led to a "growing sentiment among contemporary political scientists and political analysts that the foundations of citizenship and democracy in America are crumbling" (Dalton 2006: 1). For example, Macedo and colleagues (2005: 1) assert that:

> American democracy is at risk. The risk comes not from some external threat but from disturbing internal trends: an erosion of the activities and capacities of citizenship. Americans have turned away from politics and the public sphere in larger numbers, leaving our civic life impoverished. Citizens participate in public affairs less frequently, with less knowledge and enthusiasm, in fewer venues, and less equally than is healthy for a vibrant democratic polity….Americans should be concerned about the current state of affairs. The risk is not to our national survival but to the health and legitimacy of our shared political order.

The most important indicators of citizenship for the purposes of this study are internal and external political efficacy. Internal political efficacy refers to one's feelings of personal competence "to understand and participate effectively in politics" (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990: 290). It represents beliefs about the impact a person can have on politics and the political process as a result of her or his own skills and confidence. External political efficacy refers to one's perceptions about the responsiveness of the political system, both governmental authorities and institutions, to citizen demands (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990: 290). It is the belief that the political system is both receptive and responsive to the interests and actions of citizens. Since their development, internal and external political efficacy have become among of the most frequently used measures of general political attitudes (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990).

The American National Elections Survey (ANES) has measured political efficacy since the 1950s. As shown in Table 1, most Americans felt relatively efficacious about government through the early 1960s (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976). This result was interpreted as evidence of American governmental stability and effectiveness in responding to popular concerns (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990). However, during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, feelings of cynicism and powerlessness grew among citizens, and perceptions of political efficacy declined. For example, from 1966 to 1998, between 63 and 73 percent of ANES respondents agreed with the statement, "government is so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on." The high level of agreement with this statement reflects a low level of internal political efficacy among Americans. In 2008, 68 percent of respondents agreed with the statement.

The results for external political efficacy, which is measured with two questions, are similar. Again, a high level of agreement reflects a low level of efficacy. In 1964, 29 percent of

Table 1: Internal and External Political Efficacy, 1964-2008[a]

YEAR	Internal Political Efficacy [b]	External Political Efficacy (NO SAY)[c]	External Political Efficacy (NO CARE)[d]
1952	71	31	35
1954	**	**	**
1956	64	28	26
1958	**	**	**
1960	59	27	25
1962	**	**	**
1964	67	29	36
1966	69	34	34
1968	71	41	43
1970	73	36	47
1972	74	40	49
1974	72	40	50
1976	71	41	51
1978	72	45	51
1980	70	39	52
1982	**	45	47
1984	71	32	42
1986	**	**	52
1988	70	41	51
1990	66	54	63
1992	66	36	52
1994	65	56	66
1996	63	53	61
1998	73	42	62
2000	60	41	56
2002	**	29	31
2004	**	43	50
2008	68	49	60

[a] Numbers represent percentage of respondents who agreed with the statements measuring internal and external political efficacy. High agreement signals low levels of political efficacy.

[b] Internal political efficacy is measured a statement that asks subjects how strongly they agree that "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."

[c,d] External political efficacy is measured with two statements that ask subjects how strongly they agree that "People like me don't have any say about what the government does" (NO SAY), and "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think" (NO CARE).

Source: ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior. Available at: http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/gd-index.htm#5

respondents agreed that “people like me don't have any say about what the government does.” This rose to an all time high of 56 percent in 1994, and was at 49 percent in 2008. Likewise, in 1964 only 36 percent of respondents agreed that “I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.” The percentage in agreement with that statement rose to an all time high of 66 percent in 1994, and fell slightly to 60 percent in 2008. Although ANES data show fluctuation in political efficacy among the general population over the decades, the declines among the disadvantaged and the young are more apparent.

Since political efficacy is thought to be a key indicator of the overall health of democratic systems (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990), scholars have suggested that negative political efficacy trends could threaten the established democratic order (Easton 1965, 1975; Miller 1974). It is important to note that although perceptions of political efficacy have bounced up and down over the decades, a growing number of scholars assert that at the very least, these long-term negative developments in political efficacy “suggest, perhaps simplistically, that most Americans no longer feel that their views are represented adequately in traditional political venues” (Dennis and Owen 2001: 401-402).

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Deliberative democracy connects public decision making to participation, reasoned discussion, and the collective judgment of citizens (Cohen and Fung 2004). Broadly defined, deliberative democracy is

> A form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 3-7).

In contemporary political theory, deliberative democracy stands in contrast to aggregative democracy. While both models share assumptions about the structuring of democratic institutions, they focus on different decision making processes (Young 2000). The aggregative model, which forms the basis of representative government, is "vote-centric" (Chambers 2003); it relies on the aggregation of individual preferences to arrive at public policy decisions, and uses voting and bargaining to determine how those individual preferences are cumulated (Mansbridge 1980; Young 2000). Because voting and bargaining encourage strategic behavior based on individualist and economic incentives (Barber 1984; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Riker 1962, 1982), the aggregative model is also an adversarial model of democracy (Mansbridge 1980; Miller 2000). In this adversarial model, public policy (and other governmental) decisions are seen as a zero-sum game where majority rules (for a discussion, see Radcliff and Wingenbach 2000). Moreover, this model leaves the main work of governance to professional political elite; "the concept of [citizen] participation has only the most minimal role. Indeed, not only has it a minimal role but … the emphasis [is] placed on the dangers inherent in widespread popular participation in politics" (Pateman 1970: 1).

In contrast, deliberative democracy is "talk-centric" (Chambers 2003); it emphasizes well-informed citizen participation such that "citizens can pool information and ideas, bring local knowledge to the table, establish greater levels of equality and political opportunity, and the like" (Leib 2004: 3). Deliberative democracy

> fosters cooperation and mutual understanding rather than winning and losing (as adversarial democracy seems to); it purports to give all citizens a "voice" rather than just the most powerful or the most numerous (as tends to occur in majoritarian democracy); and it encourages citizens to make decisions based on "public reasons" that can be supported through deliberation rather than on individual prejudices that thrive in the privacy of the voting booth (Levinson 2002).

Before examining the potential benefits of deliberative democracy, three additional points must be made. First, "[a]lthough theorists of deliberative democracy vary as to how critical they are of existing representative institutions, deliberative democracy is not usually thought of as an alternative to representative democracy. It is rather an expansion of representative democracy" (Chambers 2003: 308). This relates to the second point, namely that most deliberative processes include some form of voting or preference aggregation mechanism; however, unlike in traditional aggregative systems, the focus is on the processes of preference formation that precede voting. Finally, deliberative democracy does not translate into a single method or process; rather, it is an umbrella term for a wide variety of processes, such as the Kettering National Issues Forum, deliberative polling, consensus conferences, planning cells, citizen juries, study circles, the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting, and various e-democracy initiatives, among others (Gastil and Levine 2005; for a chart describing dialogue and deliberation processes, see: http://www.thataway.org/exchange/files/docs/ddStreams1-08.pdf; for process descriptions, see: http://www.thataway.org/exchange/files/docs/Framework_Links.doc).

A discussion about the specific design of these deliberative democracy processes is beyond the scope of this article; however, key features shared among the processes include: 1) a focus on action, 2) an appeal to values, 3) the absence of pre-existing commitments, 4) mutuality of focus, 5) the free exchange of knowledge and information, and 6) activities occurring within small groups, although the overall process may involve thousands of people (Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2005; Torres 2003). Differences among the processes include, but are not limited to 1) who participates in deliberation, 2) how participants exchange information and make decisions, and 3) the link between the deliberations and policy or public action (Fung 2005; Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary 2005).

THE EDUCATIVE EFFECTS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

According to theorists, deliberative democracy may have educative effects for citizens. Carole Pateman's (1970) seminal work, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, is widely noted for its exploration of this issue, but other authors also articulate the theory well (e.g., Mansbridge 1995; Morrell 1998, 2003, 2005); thus, only a brief overview is provided here. Pateman (1970: 24-25) asserts that "the central feature of participation is an educative one, using the term education in the widest sense. [The system] is designed to develop responsible individual social and political action through the effect of the participatory process." Deliberative participation is especially expected to have significant impacts on political efficacy (Pateman 1970; see also Finkel 1985; Mansbridge 1995; Morrell 1998, 2003, 2005). Pateman (1970) explains that as one participates in politics, s/he acquires political skills and perceptions of self-competence, which are qualities necessary for popular self-government and effective control over one's environment. In addition, participation creates a circular causal process (Finkel 1985) whereby "[p]articipation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the individuals participate, the better able they become to do so" (Pateman 1970: 42-43).

Noting that Pateman's (1970) articulation better represents the concept of internal political efficacy, Finkel (1985: 893-894) asserts that the effects of participation on external political efficacy can be understood with the "mobilization of support" theory, articulated by scholars such as Ginsberg (1982), Weissberg (1975), and Wright (1976). In this view, participation should increase the belief that regime authorities are responsive to attempted influence from citizens (Craig 1979). The idea is that participation will promote citizens' feelings of legitimacy toward the political system and increase acquiescence to government (Finkel 1985). In turn, regime stability is enhanced by "inducing citizens to believe that the government is

responsive to their own needs and wishes" (Ginsberg 1982: 182) and by "encouraging [citizens] to believe that they are ultimately controlling the government …and keeping them committed to the existing system" (Olsen 1982: 6).

Despite the claims about and interest in deliberative democracy, as well as calls for more studies, empirical research lags behind both theory and practice (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004). The few empirical studies on deliberative processes that do exist show mixed results. On the one hand, several studies suggest that under certain conditions, deliberation can produce more sophisticated, tolerant, and participative citizens (Fung 2001; Fung and Wright 2003; Gastil and Dillard 1999b; Gastil, Deess, and Weiser 2002; Luskin and Fishkin 1998; Sulkin and Simon 2001). Deliberation has also been found to increase participants' levels of political knowledge (Cook and Jacobs 1999; Fishkin and Luskin 1999; Hansen and Anderson 2004; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002) and help participants form more reflective, coherent, and comprehensive judgments about the issue at hand (Carpella, Price, and Nir 2002; Fishkin and Luskin 1999; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002; Mathews 1994; Sturgis, Roberts, and Allum 2005).

On the other hand, some studies show that the short-term gains from deliberative participation result in little long-term civic engagement activity (Kimmelman and Hall 1997; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Deliberation can also reduce the consistency between attitudes and behavior among subjects, produce decisions that conflict with both expert decisions and subjects' own personal opinions, and lead to decisions participants later regret (Holt 1993, 1999; Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, and Lisle 1989; Wilson and Schooler 1991). Similarly, studies show that deliberation can cause participants to doubt that a "correct" decision exists (Armor and Taylor 2003; Iyengar and Lepper 2000), which can leave them feeling more anxious and frustrated

about the issue under discussion after deliberation than before (Button and Mattson 1999; Hendricks 2003; Kimmelman and Hall 1997).

Little research has directly examined the relationship between deliberation and political efficacy (Morrell 2005), and the few studies that do exist provide mixed results. Some studies suggest increases in perceptions of political efficacy (Gastil and Dillard 1999a, 1999b; Doble, Higgins, Begasse, and Fisher 1996; Smith 1999), but other studies show no effects of participation on political efficacy (Gastil 2004; Walsh 2003). Clearly, more research is needed. This study is a first step in that direction.

STUDY OVERVIEW

This study examines the effects on political efficacy of participation in the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting as convened by the United Agenda for Children. America*Speaks* is a non-partisan, nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. that uses the 21st Century Town Meeting (hereafter the "Town Meeting"), to engage large, demographically representative groups of citizens (from 100 to 5,000+) in simultaneous deliberation around a specific policy issue in a particular political community (Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2005). The goals of the Town Meeting are to ensure that: 1) all voices, including the general public and key stakeholders are at the table, 2) the priorities of the public get the attention of decision makers and the media, and 3) a substantial segment of the public supports the results of the forum and has a stake it its implementation (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham 2005: 157).

To meet these goals, the Town Meeting has several critical components (for a detailed discussion, see Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham 2005; Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2005; see also www.americaspeaks.org). First, America*Speaks* works closely with sponsors to conduct

widespread outreach and targeted recruitment such that the assembled group of citizens resembles the demographic makeup of the community. Second, all participants receive materials that neutrally detail and balance the perspectives on the issue(s) under consideration. Third, participants are randomly assigned to tables that seat between ten and twelve people including a trained facilitator who helps keep the dialogue on target. The fourth and fifth components are participation technologies, immediate reporting, and theming. Networked laptop computers are used at each table to instantly record the ideas of participants. This information is transmitted to a central database, where the "Theme Team" distills it into major topics, issues, ideas, and messages. The ideas from this facilitated theming are then presented back to all participants in the room to "build collective ownership of the group's work" (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham 2005: 159). In addition, all participants are given a wireless polling keypad for voting on issues and comparing their personal positions to those of others. The final component links the process and outcomes to decision makers, who are not only participants in the process, but who also pledge (and are expected) to seriously review and consider the input of participants. The design of the Town Meeting makes it an excellent deliberative process to study, as many of its design choices create a context within which one would expect to find evidence of the efficacy effect (Fung 2003, 2005; Williamson 2004).

The United Agenda for Children (UAC) is a coalition of public, private, and non-profit organizations in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. The UAC goal is to create and implement a "united action plan that would ensure that all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated" (UAC 2006). The first step toward that goal was the UAC Town Meeting, held on December 11, 2004. At that meeting, more than 1,000 people who live in Mecklenburg

County gathered to deliberate about youth education, health, and safety policies, and make recommendations to local decision and policy makers.

Research Design

The study uses a quasi-experimental research design with data from surveys collected at three points in times from two non-equivalent groups. Figure 1 displays the number of respondents and the response rates for each round of data collection. The first group includes participants those who attended the UAC Town Meeting). Separate surveys of participants were conducted at several points in time; however, individual subjects were not tracked. The second group includes non-participants (citizens of the greater Charlotte area who did not attend the UAC Town Meeting). During the weeks before the UAC Town Meeting (Time 1) a telephone survey was administered to random samples of participants and non-participants. The sample of participants was randomly selected from the list of individuals who pre-registered to attend the UAC Town Meeting. Non-participants were selected using random telephone dial technologies. A total of 138 participants and 299 non-participants completed telephone surveys. When calculated using the total number of pre-registrants at the time of administration, the overall response rate for both groups was 63%, with 89.2% of participants and 57.3% of non-participants responding.

Time 2 was immediately after the UAC Town Meeting. At the meeting, all participants received a self-administered survey in the packet of materials provided by America*Speaks*. Participants were asked to complete the survey at the end of the day and return it to a drop-box before leaving the event. They were also provided with a pre-addressed, stamped return envelope so completed surveys could be mailed at a later point in time to the researcher. Approximately 1,103 individuals attended the event. Of these, 676 were pre-registrants, 187 were walk-in

participants, and about 240 were walk-ins that were not accounted for at the registration table. A total of 525 participants completed surveys, yielding a response rate of about 47.6%. Non-participants were not surveyed at Time 2.

Figure 1: Subjects and Response Rates for Data Collection



Note: A solid line shows that individual-level survey data can be linked for those times. A dotted line shows that individual-level data cannot be linked for those times.

The final round of data collection took place at Time 3, approximately 24 months after the UAC Town Meeting. Surveys were mailed in December 2006, and again to all non-respondents in February 2007. Subjects for this round of data collection included participants in the UAC Town Meeting who were accounted for at the registration table, as well as all non-participants surveyed at Time 1 who provided full names and addresses during the telephone interview. With these restrictions, a total of 863 participants and 125 non-participants were mailed surveys. Participants returned 140 completed surveys, producing a response rate of about

16.2%. Non-participants returned 40 surveys, producing a response rate of 32%. It is important to note that the original research design provided for individual level links between subjects at Times 1 and 3; however, due to low responses rates, only 17 participants and 36 non-participants can be linked between these times. Given these low numbers, comparisons using date from Time 3 are given minimal attention in this article.

Variable Measurement

Internal and external political efficacy are measured with standardized summative indices consisting of several different survey items. All items are 5 point Likert scale questions with the anchors of 1 = *strongly disagree* and 5 = *strongly agree*. Several steps were used to test the survey items and the indices for validity and reliability.[1] First, items were grouped into a potential index based on face validity, and principal components factor analysis was conducted to test the fit of each item within the preliminary index. Second, items were selected based on both the unrotated and quartimax rotated factor loadings, then the psychometric adequacy of each index was evaluated using Cronbach's alpha, an estimate of the reliability and internal consistency of responses to the items comprising a given scale (Cronbach 1951). Finally, items were combined into a summative index, which was then standardized. Cases where a respondent did not answer a question that was included in a final index were omitted from the analyses.

Internal political efficacy (IPE) is measured with the following three items, which ask how strongly the subject agreed that:

1) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on [COMPLICATED];

[1] Before creating the indices, the data were cleaned. Most of the Likert scale questions had an option to respond as "don't know" or "not sure." These responses were recoded from 99 to system missing so as to not skew analytic results. In addition, negatively worded questions were recoded with an inverse scale.

2) I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics [MEQUAL]; and
3) I often don't feel sure of myself when talking about politics or government [NOTSURE].

External political efficacy (EPE) is measured with the following four items, which ask how strongly the subject agreed that:

1) Elected officials don't care what people like me think [NOCARE];
2) People like me don't have any say about what the government does [NOSAY];
3) Elected officials are only interested in people's votes [OFFVOTE]; and
4) Local government is responsive to citizen concerns [LOCRESP].

It is important to note that these four questions relate to perceptions of government's responsiveness, not to the actual responsiveness of the convening organization (United Agenda for Children) to the Town Meeting input.

Table 2 displays the rotated factor loadings for each item in each index, as well Cronbach's reliability score.[2] The factor loadings in both indices are all reasonable, perhaps with the exception of LOCRESP in the EPE index. The reliability scores, .610 and .676 for internal and external political efficacy respectively, are less than .70, the standard cut-off for high reliability, which suggest that there is some measurement error in theses variables.[3] However, scholars have long associated measure of political efficacy with a "lack of validity and reliability" (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990: 289; for a discussion particularly about internal political efficacy, see Morrell 1999, 2003, 2005).

[2] During this phase, indices were separately examined for four different samples: (1) both non-participants and participants at Time 1; (2) only non-participants at Time 1; (3) only participants at Time 1; and, (4) participants at Time 2. However, for the purposes of this study, only the validity and reliability results for the pooled sample of participants and non-participants at Time 1 are reported.

[3] It should be noted that these indices differ slightly from the ANES measures of internal and external political efficacy; however, considerable variation exists in how these constructs are operationalized in research (Morrell 2003, 2005).

Table 2: Rotated Factor Loadings and Alpha Scores for IPE and EPE*

		Factor Loadings
Internal Political Efficacy (IPE) α=.610	COMPLICATED	.728
	MEQUAL	.669
	NOTSURE	.809
External Political Efficacy (EPE) α=.676	NOCARE	.791
	NOSAY	.690
	OFFVOTE	.723
	LOCRESP	.583

*Factor loadings are for participants and non-participants at Time 1 (n = 437)

In addition to the IPE and EPE indices, several demographic characteristics, including race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, educational level, and socioeconomic status (SES), are used as control variables. Previous political participatory activities, including whether in the last year the subject had attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election, are also used as control variables in some models. All variables for demographic characteristics and previous political participatory activities are dichotomous.[4]

Analyses

Because this study uses non-equivalent comparison groups without random assignment, it suffers from selection bias threats. Of particular concern is the threat of self-selection, because the outcome "effect may be due to the difference between the kinds of people in one

[4] Race is measured as 0 = White/Caucasian, and 1 = all other racial groups. Age is measured as 0 = 18-44 years old, and 1 = 45 and older. Gender is measured as 0 = male, and 1 = female. Employment status is measured as 0 = not employed, 1 = employed. Parental status is measured as 0 = no children and 1 = children. Education level is measured as 0 = no higher education degree, and 1 = associates, bachelors, or graduate/professional degree. SES is measured as 0 = total household income of $49,999 or less, and 1 = total household income of $50,000 or more (according to the U.S. Census Bureau, the median household income in 2004 in Charlotte, NC was $40, 863; see: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html). Previous political participatory activities are measured as 0 = no and 1 = yes.

experimental group as opposed to another" (Cook and Campbell 1979: 53). The potential for selection bias is manifest in at least three ways in this study: 1) potential differences between participants and non-participants; 2) potential differences between the pre-registrant and walk-in participants; and 3) potential differences among those who completed surveys and those who did not (these are complicated by the fact that the survey was administered at multiple points in time).

There are two types of self-selection bias: selection on the observables and selection on the unobservables. Selection on the observables, concerns differences between groups that can be estimated from the data. In this study, it is highly probable that variables besides participation status affect political efficacy among the subjects. For example, a significant body of research indicates that political efficacy is correlated with demographic characteristics and that demographic characteristics are related to participation (Dowse and Hughes 1972; Kleiman 1976; Lyons 1970; Martinussen 1972; Orum 1989; Verba and Nie 1972). To control for this problem, estimates of the difference in political efficacy between two groups (i.e., non-participants and participants, or participants at different points in time), are presented with OLS regression, where IPE and EPE are separately examined as a function of participation status and demographic variables, including race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and SES.

When comparing participants and non-participants, the OLS models are specified as:

$$\mathrm{IPE} = \mathrm{a} + \mathrm{bP} + \mathrm{d}\sum \mathrm{X_k} + e$$
$$\mathrm{EPE} = \mathrm{a} + \mathrm{bP} + \mathrm{d}\sum \mathrm{X_k} + e$$

where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = participant, and $\sum X_k$ includes all demographic variables. When comparing participants at different points in time, the OLS models are specified as:

$$IPE = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$
$$EPE = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$

where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participant at the earlier time, and 1 = participant at the later time, and $\sum X_k$ includes all demographic variables.

These OLS models control for the potential selection on the observables problem in that they examine the IPE and EPE differences between the groups while holding demographic variables constant. However, the OLS estimates of the difference between the two groups may be biased due to selection on the unobservables, or information not captured in the survey that affects the decision to participate in the program and the outcome, in this case, political efficacy. To control for this problem, I also analyzed the data using Heckman treatment effect models for comparisons of participants and non-participants, and propensity score matching models for comparisons of participants at different points in time.

Heckman treatment effect models (TEM) use a two equation approach that addresses several classes of selection bias, including bias due to self-selection (Briggs 2004; Heckman 1978, 1979; Heckman and Robb 1985, 1986). The first equation is a selection equation, which predicts some binary outcome. In this case, the binary outcome is participation (i.e., whether one is a participant or non-participant), as predicted by the demographic variables and the variables that indicate previous political participatory activities. The second equation is a structural equation, which examines the ultimate dependent variable(s) of interest. In this case, the dependent variables are internal and external political efficacy, which were regressed as a function of participation and all demographic variables. Using these two equations, the marginal effects of participation on political efficacy are assessed. The Wald chi-square statistic (a measure of goodness of fit) and the likelihood ratio test of independent equations (LR test, a

measure of the relationship between the two equations), are used to determine whether the OLS regression models or the Heckman models provide more consistent estimators of the efficacy differences between participants and non-participants. The TEM models are specified as:

$$\text{Equation 1:} \quad P = a + bP + d\sum X_k + g\sum V_k + e$$
$$\text{Equation 2: IPE (or EPE)} = a + bP + d\sum X_k + e$$

where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = participant, $\sum X_k$ = demographic variables, and $\sum V_k$ = previous participatory activities.

Propensity score matching (PSM) is a non-experimental method of sampling that deals with the problem of selection bias, and thus allows for more robust comparisons of two groups. PSM produces a control group whose distribution of covariates is similar to that of the treated group (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Conditioning many covariates produces a problem of dimensionality that calls for a method of summarizing multi-dimensional covariates. PSM adopts one-dimensional propensity scores to achieve the "dimension reduction" (Hahn 1998: 317; D'Agostino and Rubin 2000). The PSM method consists of four steps: 1) estimating the propensity score; 2) checking the balance of covariates; 3) matching subjects either through pair matching or sub-classification; and 4) calculating the average treatment effects (Becker and Ichino 2002; Dehejia and Wahba 1999, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, 1984).

In this study, a binary probit model is employed to estimate the propensity score. Time is the dependent variable, and covariates include all demographic variables and variables that indicate previous political participatory activities. The second equation examines IPE and EPE as a function of time and demographic characteristics. Participants at each time of comparative interest are then "matched" using one-to-one pair matching without replacement. Paired t-tests are conducted to get consistent estimates of program effects, that is, to determine whether

participation in the program had an impact on subjects' perceptions of political efficacy as measured by the changes in political efficacy among participants at various points in time. The specification of the PSM models is:

$$\text{Equation 1}: \quad T = a + d\sum X_k + g\sum V_k + e$$
$$\text{Equation 2}: \text{IPE (or EPE)} = a + bT + d\sum X_k + e$$

where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participants at earlier time, and 1 = participants at later time, $\sum X_k$ = demographic variables, and $\sum V_k$ = previous participatory activities.

RESULTS

The results are presented in the following order. First, participants and non-participants at Time 1 are compared to determine whether they had different perceptions of political efficacy before the UAC Town Meeting. Second, participants at Time 2 are compared to participants at Time 1 to determine whether political efficacy increased after participation in the UAC Town Meeting. To determine whether the effects of participation on political efficacy persisted over time, participants at Time 3 are compared separately to participants at Time 2 and Time 1. Participants and non-participants at Time 3 are then compared, as are non-participants at Time 3 and Time 1.

Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1

Both the OLS and TEM models were employed to find statistically consistent estimators of the differences in IPE and EPE between participants and non-participants at Time 1. For IPE, the TEM results show a large and significant chi-square statistic (52.40, $p < .000$) and a significant LR test (14.45, $p < .0001$), indicating that we must reject the null hypothesis that rho

is zero. This means that the two equations are related, there is self-selection in the samples, and that the OLS estimate is biased. Therefore, the Heckman results provide a better estimate of the effect of participation on IPE. The Heckman structural model indicates that, holding all else constant, participation was related to IPE in a statistically significant way ($p < .000$), with participants feeling less internally efficacious than non-participants. These results are displayed in Table 3.

Table 3: TEM Results - IPE among Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1

	IPE Coefficient (p-value)	
Parameter	**Structural Model**	**Selection Model**
PARTICIPATION	-1.1879 (.000)	--
GENDER	.5398 (.000)	.4848 (.009)
EMPLOYMENT	-.0999 (.466)	-.0922 (.618)
AGE	.0507 (.703)	.0454 (.802)
PARENT	.0668 (.609)	.2030 (.250)
RACE	.0919 (.495)	.0712 (.701)
EDUCATION	-.2343 (.104)	.0936 (.639)
SES	-.1974 (.148)	-.1154 (.542)
SCHOOL	--	.8327 (.000)
OFFICIAL	--	.8210 (.000)
TOWNHALL	--	.0188 (.903)
VOTE	--	.0978 (.715)
CONSTANT	.2640 (.222)	-1.8616 (.000)
Log likelihood		-585.64741
Wald Chi-Square (sig.)		52.40 (.000)
Rho		.6365374
LR test of independent equations		14.45 (.0001)
Sample Size		315

In terms of EPE, the chi-square statistic is fairly small and significant (21.49, $p < .006$), but the LR test is not significant (1.26, $p < .2611$), indicating that we should not reject the null hypothesis that rho is zero. This means that the two equations are not related and that there is no

self-selection in the samples. Thus, the OLS estimate for EPE is not biased and is better than the Heckman result. The OLS results indicate that when controlling for demographic characteristics, participants had significantly lower levels of EPE ($p < .037$) than non-participants. These results are displayed in Table 4. Together, these results suggest that prior to the UAC Town Meeting, participants had significantly lower perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than non-participants.

Table 4: OLS Results - EPE among Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1

Parameter	**EPE**		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	.530 (.199)	…	2.666 (.008)
Participation	-.253 (.121)	-.119	-2.095 (.037)
Race	.093 (.123)	.045	.756 (.451)
Age	-.112 (.121)	-.056	-.923 (.357)
Gender	-.260 (.122)	-.123	-2.134 (.034)
Employment	.114 (.126)	.052	.904 (.367)
Parent	.022 (.118)	.012	.185 (.853)
Education	-.293 (.131)	-.139	-2.242 (.026)
SES	-.232 (.125)	-.115	-1.853 (.065)
F-test (Sig.)	3.262 (.001)		
SEE	.96783		
R^2	.079		
Adj. R^2	.055		

Participants at Time 1 and Time 2

The analyses of participants at Time 1 and Time 2 get to the heart of the study as they search for evidence of the efficacy effect among participants. OLS and PSM were used to estimate the effects of participation on IPE and EPE. Since PSM does not provide statistics with which to compare the efficiency of estimators, both sets of results are presented and discussed. The OLS results, displayed in Table 5, indicate that when controlling for demographic characteristics, time had no significant effect on IPE ($p < .506$); however, it did have a statistically significant effect on EPE ($p < .024$). In other words, the OLS results suggest that immediately following the UAC Town Meeting, participants experienced a statistically significant increase in external political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy.

Table 5: OLS Results - IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 2

Parameter	**IPE**			**EPE**		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	-.496 (.237)	…	-2.095 (.037)	-.545 (.221)	…	-2.460 (.014)
Time	.077 (.116)	.037	.666 (.506)	.245 (.108)	.125	2.267 (.024)
Race	.142 (.117)	.071	1.212 (.226)	-.179 (.109)	-.095	-1.638 (.102)
Age	.283 (.118)	.142	2.400 (.017)	.088 (.110)	.047	.800 (.424)
Gender	.018 (.123)	.008	.145 (.885)	-.074 (.115)	-.036	-.643 (.521)
Employment	.179 (.143)	.070	1.249 (.212)	.166 (.134)	.068	1.241 (.215)
Parent	.146 (.115)	.074	1.263 (.207)	.282 (.108)	.151	2.616 (.009)
Education	-.018 (.146)	-.008	-.125 (.901)	.155 (.136)	.071	1.143 (.254)
SES	-.169 (.125)	-.082	-1.355 (.176)	-.069 (.117)	-.035	-.589 (.556)
F-test (Sig.)	1.362 (.212)			2.523 (.011)		
SEE	.98977			.92465		
R^2	.031			.056		
Adj. R^2	.008			.034		

The results from the PSM models are displayed in Table 6. The one-to-one pair matching of 93 participants suggests that after the UAC Town Meeting, perceptions of IPE increased by about 7.4%, although this increase is not statistically significant ($p < .55$). In contrast, EPE increased by over 31%; this result is statistically significant ($p < .0059$). Together the OLS and PSM results show that participation had a positive and statistically significant impact on external political efficacy. Internal political efficacy also increased, though not in a statistically significant way.

Table 6: PSM Results - IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 2

	Pairs	Time 1	Time 2	Effect	Std. Err.	T-Stat	P-value
IPE	93	-.0710	-.1452	.0742	.1245	0.60	0.55
EPE	93	.0590	-.2522	.3112	.1105	2.82	.0059

The Persistence of the Efficacy Effect

Three sets of comparisons were made to examine the persistence of the efficacy effect. First, IPE and EPE among participants at Time 3 were compared to participants at Time 2 and Time 1 using OLS and PSM methods. Second, participants at Time 3 were compared to non-participants at Time 3 using OLS and TEM. Finally, non-participants at Time 1 were compared to non-participants at Time 3 using paired t-tests. The results of these analyses are below.

First, the results of both the OLS and PSM models indicate that internal and external political efficacy did not change in a significant way for participants between Time 2 and Time 3. The OLS results, displayed in Table 7, indicate that when controlling for demographic characteristics, time had no significant effect on IPE ($p < .675$) or EPE ($p < .291$). The PSM results, displayed in Table 8, agree; participants did not experience statistically significant

changes in IPE ($p < .8108$) or EPE ($p < .6753$) between Time 1 and Time 2. These results suggest that the increases in perceptions of IPE and EPE as a result of participation in the UAC Town Meeting persisted, but did not change significantly over time.

Table 7: OLS Results - IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 2 and Time 3

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	.099 (.237)	…	.420 (.675)	-.243 (.230)	…	-1.058 (.291)
Time	.041 (.125)	.019	.326 (.744)	-.083 (.122)	-.040	-.685 (.494)
Race	-.080 (.120)	-.040	-.662 (.509)	-.118 (.117)	-.060	-1.009 (.314)
Age	.170 (.130)	.085	1.309 (.191)	.143 (.126)	.072	1.133 (.258)
Gender	.020 (.120)	.010	.171 (.865)	-.225 (.116)	-.108	-1.936 (.054)
Employment	.000 (.157)	.000	-.001 (.999)	.176 (.152)	.064	1.155 (.249)
Parent	.013 (.120)	.007	.111 (.911)	.190 (.116)	.096	1.632 (.104)
Education	-.184 (.162)	-.071	-1.135 (.257)	.227 (.157)	.090	1.449 (.148)
SES	-.168 (.133)	-.084	-1.261 (.208)	-.155 (.129)	-.078	-1.198 (.232)
F-test (Sig.)	.714 (.679)			1.970 (.050)		
SEE	1.00791			.97650		
R^2	.017			.045		
Adj. R^2	-.007			.022		

Table 8: PSM Results - IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 2 and Time 3

	Pairs	Time 2	Time 3	Effect	Std. Err.	T-Stat	P-value
IPE	115	-.0319	.0006	-.0325	.13283	-0.24	.8108
EPE	115	-.1037	-.0513	-.0524	.1260	-0.42	.6753

The OLS results comparing participants at Time 1 and Time 3 are displayed in Table 9. They indicate that when controlling for demographic characteristics, time had a statistically significant effect on IPE ($p < .008$) but not on EPE ($p < .121$). In other words, participants experienced a statistically significant increase in internal political efficacy from immediately before the UAC Town Meeting until 24 months after the UAC Town Meeting. External political efficacy also increased, but not in a statistically significant way.

Table 9: OLS Results - IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 3

Parameter	**IPE**			**EPE**		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	-.334 (.284)	…	-1.176 (.241)	-.244 (.261)	…	-.933 (.352)
Time	.370 (.137)	.186	2.697 (.008)	.196 (.126)	.111	1.556 (.121)
Race	.099 (.134)	.048	.738 (.461)	.241 (.123)	.132	1.963 (.051)
Age	-.184 (.145)	-.091	-1.265 (.207)	-.122 (.133)	-.069	-.918 (.360)
Gender	.493 (.146)	.215	3.387 (.001)	-.112 (.134)	-.055	-.837 (.403)
Employment	.197 (.146)	.085	1.345 (.180)	.222 (.134)	.108	1.651 (.100)
Parent	-.083 (.139)	-.042	-.599 (.550)	-.005 (.127)	-.003	-.037 (.971)
Education	-.183 (.192)	-.068	-.949 (.344)	-.133 (.177)	-.055	-.751 (.454)
SES	-.369 (.151)	-.184	-2.438 (.016)	-.054 (.139)	-.031	-.390 (.697)
F-test (Sig.)	3.983 (.000)			1.625 (.119)		
SEE	.95207			.87456		
R^2	.121			.053		
Adj. R^2	.090			.020		

Interestingly, the PSM results, displayed in Table 10, suggest the opposite, that participants experienced a statistically significant change in EPE ($p < .09$), but not IPE (p

< .4792) during this time period. As noted previously, it is probable that there is significant endogeneity in these models; therefore, the OLS estimates are likely to be biased upward. Moreover, the TEM comparisons of participants and non-participants suggested that the OLS estimates for IPE suffered from selection bias. Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the PSM results are more consistent than those from the OLS model. Following this logic, it appears that only EPE increased in a statistically significant way among participants between Time 1 and Time 3.

Table 10: PSM Results - IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 3

	Pairs	Time 1	Time 3	Effect	Std. Err.	T-Stat	P-value
IPE	115	-.0319	-.1262	.0944	.1322	.71	.4792
EPE	115	-.1037	-.3012	.1976	.1158	1.71	.0900

Second, OLS and TEM models were used to compare participants and non-participants at Time 3. The TEM results show a small but significant chi-square statistic for IPE (19.24, p <.0136), and small but insignificant chi-square statistic for EPE (11.50, p < .1751). The LR tests indicate that we should not reject the null hypothesis that rho is zero for either IPE (1.18, p < .2775) or EPE (0.62, p < .4328). Therefore, the two equations are not related, there is no self-selection in the samples, and the OLS estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants and non-participants are better than those generated by the TEM. Accordingly, only the OLS results, displayed in Table 11, are presented here. These results indicate that when controlling for demographic characteristics, there were no significant differences in IPE between participants and non-participants at Time 3 (p < .446). This result suggests that the gains in internal political efficacy that participants experienced, though not statistically significant, were

large enough to catch them up with non-participants. In contrast, however, EPE was significantly lower among participants at Time 3 than non-participants at Time 3 ($p < .085$).

Table 11: OLS Results - IPE and EPE among Participants and Non-Participants at Time 3

Parameter	IPE			EPE		
	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)	B (St. Err.)	Beta	t (Sig.)
Intercept	1.334 (.707)	…	1.885 (.061)	.395 (.698)	…	.566 (.573)
Participation	.164 (.215)	.065	.764 (.446)	-.367 (.212)	-.152	-1.733 (.085)
Race	-.189 (.191)	-.085	-.991 (.323)	.274 (.188)	.128	1.459 (.147)
Age	-.133 (.112)	-.120	-1.181 (.240)	-.007 (.111)	-.007	-.065 (.948)
Gender	.257 (.175)	.120	1.470 (.144)	-.427 (.172)	-.209	-2.480 (.014)
Employment	-.271 (.211)	-.108	-1.287 (.200)	.059 (.208)	.025	.284 (.777)
Parent	-.186 (.191)	-.090	-.977 (.330)	-.023 (.188)	-.012	-.125 (.901)
Education	-.461 (.273)	-.146	-1.692 (.093)	.224 (.269)	.074	.834 (.406)
SES	-.405 (.214)	-.174	-1.891 (.061)	-.210 (.211)	-.094	-.993 (.323)
F-test (Sig.)	2.490 (.015)			1.483 (.169)		
SEE	.97478			.96174		
R^2	.126			.079		
Adj. R^2	.075			.026		

Finally, non-participants at Time 1 and Time 3 were compared. Thirty-six responses from non-participants at Time 1 and Time 3 can be linked; therefore, paired t-tests were conducted to determine whether there were IPE and EPE differences between non-participants during this time period. The results, displayed in Table 12, indicate that between Time 1 and Time 3, there were no significant changes in non-participants' perceptions of internal ($p < .352$) or external political efficacy ($p < .840$).

Table 12: T-Test Results - IPE and EPE for Non-Participants at Time 1 and Time 3

	Time 1	**Time 3**			
	Mean (st. dev.)	**Mean (st. dev.)**	**Mean Difference (st. dev.)**	**T-Stat (p-value)**	***df***
IPE	-.2253 (1.0814)	-.0709 (1.0019)	-.1544 (.9543)	-.943 (.352)	33
EPE	.0279 (1.1885)	-.0115 (1.0433)	.0394 (1.1311)	.203 (.840)	33

A brief summary of the results is in order. First, before the UAC Town Meeting, participants had significantly lower perceptions of both internal and external political efficacy than non-participants. This suggests that in this case, America*Speaks* was effective in engaging the less efficacious among the citizenry in the UAC Town Meeting process. Second, after the UAC Town Meeting, participants experienced an increase in both internal and external political efficacy; however, only the increase in external political efficacy was statistically significant. These results suggest that the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting produced the efficacy effect, particularly with respect to external political efficacy. Third, there were no significant changes in internal or external political efficacy among participants at Time 2 and Time 3, suggesting that the efficacy effect persisted over time. Moreover, there were no statistically significant changes in internal political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 3; however, the difference in external political efficacy was statistically significant, again providing partial evidence of the efficacy effect in the case of the UAC Town Meeting. Finally, the strength of the efficacy effect is evidenced by other results. There were no significant changes in non-participants' perceptions of IPE or EPE between Time 1 and Time 3, and unlike before the UAC Town Meeting, there were no statistically significant differences in internal political efficacy between participants and non-participants at Time 3. However, there were significant differences in external political efficacy between participants and non-participants 24 months after the UAC Town Meeting.

Because the comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over time, the strength of the findings regarding the effects of participation in the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting on perceptions of political efficacy increases.

DISCUSSION

The results of this study have important implications. First, the comparison of participants and non-participants before the UAC Town Meeting shows that when demographic variables are held constant, participants had significantly lower perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than non-participants. While the efficacy differences between participants and non-participants are not surprising, the direction of the differences is. A significant both of research reports that those with high levels of political efficacy get involved in politics, while those with low levels of political efficacy do not (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Austin and Pinkleton 1995; Balch 1974; Blais 2000; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Clarke and Acock 1989; Converse 1972; Craig 1979; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Finkel 1985; Fraser 1970; Good and Mayer 1975; Hawkins, Marando, and Taylor 1971; Horwitt 1999; Langton and Karns 1969; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991; Orum 1989). These results stand in contrast to the standard findings, suggesting that, at least in this case, the architects of the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting were effective in generating participation from the less efficacious members of the community. These findings are also in line with those reported in two recent studies (Lazer, Neblo, Esterling, and Goldschmidt 2009; Neblo, Esterling, Kennedy, Lazer, and Sokhey 2009).

Two possible explanations of this finding are worth noting. First, the majority of research regarding political efficacy and participation has examined traditional methods of political

participation, such as voting, campaigning, and protesting. The deliberative nature of the 21st Century Town Meeting, which is fundamentally different from that of traditional political activities, may have attracted less efficacious citizens. Perhaps these individuals viewed the UAC Town Meeting as an opportunity to express their interests and exact responsibility and accountability from government officials. A second, and even more plausible explanation is that the context and subject matter of the UAC Town Meeting (youth policy pertaining to health, education, and safety) was important and controversial enough to motivate the less efficacious to participate. Thus, maybe political participation in such events is contingent on the subject matter of deliberation and on the context in which political participation is to take place. Whatever the explanation, it appears that in the case of the UAC Town Meeting, the America*Speaks* process was successful in engaging less efficacious citizens.

The engagement of the less efficacious, while good, may not be a sufficient reason to use deliberative processes; however, if such processes generate the efficacy effect, then the strength of advocates' arguments grows. The results of this study show that there were statistically significant increases in subjects' perceptions of external political efficacy after participation in the UAC Town Meeting. Moreover, internal political efficacy also increased after the UAC Town Meeting, but not in a statistically significant way. Thus, in this case, the UAC Town Meeting was at least partially successful in generating the efficacy effect among participants in that it significantly impacted external political efficacy, or feelings about the responsiveness of government and its authorities. In general, these findings buttress the mobilization of support of theory more so than Pateman's (1970) theory.

The potential value of deliberative democracy increases to the extent that deliberative processes result in long-term and sustainable benefits to citizenship indicators. The results of this

study show that among participants, internal and external political efficacy neither increased nor decreased in a significant way 24 months after participation (i.e., between Time 2 and Time 3). Moreover, the results indicate that among participants, external political efficacy was significantly higher at Time 3 than at Time 1. Internal political efficacy also increased among participants between these time periods, although not in a statistically significant manner. These results suggest that the increases in perceptions of external political efficacy persisted over time after participation. It is, however, important to note that participants at the UAC Town Meeting had access to data showing that the meeting helped produce an increase in funding for school nurses and launched a unified oversight committee to advocate for children's issues. This may have influenced their perceptions of external political efficacy.

Together, these results provide interesting insights about the nature of the relationship between deliberative participation and political efficacy. Research shows that external efficacy is profoundly affected by political events (Clarke and Acock 1989; Gurin and Brim 1984); it evolves and transforms in response to changes in the political landscape. Moreover, deliberative theory rests on the observation that effective participation requires the belief that participation matters, that government is listening and will be responsive (Finkel 1985). It is not surprising then, that external efficacy in this study is reactive to interventions that are explicitly supported by (and have the explicit support of) key political decision makers, as is found in the 21st Century Town Meeting.

Whereas external efficacy is malleable, internal efficacy may be more stable. Internal efficacy is a product of political socialization and all of its accompanying social, familial, educational, and other forces (Almond and Verba 1963). As such, it develops over time in response to personal experiences, vicarious experiences, social persuasions, and physiological

factors (Bandura 1994). Thus, while perceptions of internal political efficacy can change, it is not surprising that a one-time, eight-hour intervention did not change significantly the way people feel about their abilities to participate in politics. This then, may be the lynchpin on which the educative effects of participatory theory turns. It may not be enough to have a singular deliberative experience; deliberative events may need to happen several times before internal efficacy will change in a statistically meaningful way. This issue merits future testing.

Two additional results from this section are worth discussing. First, statistically significant differences in internal political efficacy between participants and non-participants did exist at Time 1, but not at Time 3. Therefore, the results at Time 3 are evidence that participation did impact internal political efficacy, albeit not in a statistically significant manner. Significant differences in external political efficacy between participants and non-participants at Time 3 remained. Second, the results show that there were no significant differences in non-participants' perceptions of internal or external political efficacy between Time 1 and Time 3. This is important because it demonstrates that the comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over time. When viewed holistically, these results add strength to the findings regarding the effects of participation in the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting on perceptions of political efficacy, and particularly external political efficacy.

Several limitations to this study are worth noting, each of which gives rise to directions for future research. First, although the 21st Century Town Meeting has many of the design features one would expect from an "ideal" deliberative process (Williamson 2004), it is still very specialized and highly unique. The Town Meeting process involves lengthy and elaborate preparation, significant use of new technologies, and varying modes of deliberation. It is a highly managed process, from the development of a neutral statement of the issue (including issue

definition), to intensive facilitation and deliberation, to the writing of outcomes and recommendations for decision makers. The process is intensive for participants, especially when compared to many other deliberative processes, involving at least 8 full hours of deliberation and discussion. When coupled with the design elements of the Town Meeting, these features raise important questions about the generalizability of findings from this study.

I believe, however, that the findings are generalizable to other manifestations of the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting. America*Speaks* conducts several Town Meetings a year. Although the Town Meetings occur in different communities and focus on different issues, the format of the Town Meeting process stays the same, increasing the likelihood of generalizability in these settings. Nevertheless, it is plausible that the effects of participation on political efficacy may change depending on the subject matter of deliberation. Moreover, the findings may also hold in studies of deliberative democracy where the observed process shares similar procedural elements or structural characteristics with the 21st Century Town Meeting. These are matters for future research.

Second, individual respondents in this study cannot be linked over time, and we must be wary in asserting the overall impact of the process on perceptions of political efficacy. Given the low response rates, this is particularly true for the results on the persistence of the efficacy effect. The linking of respondents over time would be a feature in the ultimate deliberative democracy research design, as it would readily allow scholars to assess the individual level changes that accrue as a result of participation. Moreover, it would be useful to examine multiple examples of a singular deliberative democracy process and to engage in comparative studies of two or more deliberative democracy processes.

Finally, it is important to recognize that the dependent variables for internal and external political efficacy have measurement error. This may raise questions about the strength of the results reported here. Despite the measurement error, the effects of participation on external political efficacy were significant above the 90% confidence level. If political efficacy is a key characteristic to be developed by participation, then it is necessary to have reliable and consistent measures of the concept. While some work in this area is progressing, particularly with respect to internal political efficacy (Morrell 2003, 2005), a considerable amount of additional work is needed. On a related note, scholars also need to develop reliable and consistent measures of other indicators of citizenship skills and dispositions. For example, researchers need to develop measures for political empathy, trust, sophistication, respect, and sociotropism. Until these measures are developed and tested, the impacts of deliberative democracy on the skills and dispositions of citizenship cannot be fully understood and appraised.

CONCLUSION

In addition to showing that the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting was successful in encouraging less efficacious citizens to participate, this study provides partial support for the idea that deliberative democracy can produce the efficacy effect. Most notably, the results show that external efficacy, which regards perceptions about the responsiveness of government to citizen demands, increased in a statistically significant way following participation in the UAC Town Meeting. Internal political efficacy, which regards perceptions of one's competence to engage in politics, also increased after participation, although not in a statistically significant way. These results provide some support for the claims that deliberative democracy produces the efficacy effect; however, the results also suggest a need for additional theorizing and testing.

Despite its limitations, this research still informs the study of deliberative democracy and has theoretical and practical importance. The results give much needed indications about the impacts and outcomes of deliberative democracy processes, in this case, the America*Speaks* 21st Century Town Meeting. Scholars can use this information to refine theory, enhance practice, and design better research studies. Research needs to move beyond normative speculation about the intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy to theoretical development and empirical assessment. Scholars need to better articulate the theory of deliberative democracy, and develop specific ideas about how various deliberative features and practices contribute to outcomes. Until such theorizing and testing is underway, we cannot determine whether institutionalizing deliberative democracy in the regular practices of government is warranted.

RERERENCES

Abramson, Paul R. (1983). Political Attitudes in America. *Science*, 220: 1144-1145.

Abramson, Paul R. and John H. Aldrich (1982). The Decline of Electoral Participation in America. *The American Political Science Review*, 76(3): 502-521.

Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba (1963). *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Armor, David A. and Shelley E. Taylor (2003). The Effects of Mind-Set on Behavior: Self-Regulation in Deliberative and Implementational Frames of Mind. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,* 29: 86-95.

Austin, Erica B. and Bruce E. Pinkleton (1995). Positive and Negative Effects of Political Disaffection on the Less Experienced Voter. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 39*, 215-235.

Balch, George I. (1974). Multiple Indicators of Survey Research: The Concept of "Sense of Political Efficacy." *Political Methodology*, 1: 1-43.

Bandura, Albert (1977). Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change. *Psychological Review*, 84: 191-215.

Bandura, Albert (1982). Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency. *American Psychologist*, 37: 122-47.

Bandura, Albert (1994). Self-Efficacy. In: V. S. Ramachaudran (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Human Behavior*, 4: 71-81. New York, NY: Academic Press.

Barber, Benjamin (1984). *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Becker, Sascha O. and Andrea Ichino (2002). Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Based on Propensity Scores. *Stata Journal*, 2(4): 358-377

Benhabib, Seyla (1992). *Situating the Self: Gender Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics.* New York: Routledge.

Benhabib, Seyla. (1996). Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy. In: S. Benhabib (Ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, 67-94. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bingham, Lisa B., Tina Nabatchi, Rosemary, O'Leary (2005). The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government. *Public Administration Review*, 65(5): 528-539.

Blais, André (2000). *To Vote or Not To Vote? The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Briggs, Derek C. (2004). Causal Inference and the Heckman Model. *Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics*, 29(4): 397-420.

Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1962). *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Button, Mark and Kevin Mattson (1999). Deliberative Democracy in Practice: Challenges and Prospects for Civic Deliberation. *Polity,* 31(4): 609-637.

Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller (1954). *The Voter Decides.* Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.

Carpella, Joseph N., Vincent Price, and Lilach Nir (2002). Argument Repertoire as a Reliable and Valid Measure of Opinion Quality: Electronic Dialogue during Campaign 2000. *Political Communication,* 19: 73-93.

Chambers, Simone (2003). Deliberative Democratic Theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 6: 307-326.

Clarke, Harold D. and Alan C. Acock (1989). National Elections and Political Attitudes. *British Journal of Political Science*, 19(4): 551-562.

Cohen, Joshua and Archon Fung (2004). Radical Democracy. *Swiss Journal of Political Science,* 10(4): 23-34.

Cohen, Joshua and Joel Rogers (1995). Solidarity, Democracy, Association. In: E.O. Wright (Ed.), *Associations and Democracy,* 236-267. London-New York: Verso.

Converse, Philip E. (1972). Change in the American Electorate. In: A. Campbell and P. E. Converse (Eds.), *The Human Meaning of Social Change*, 263-337. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

Cook, Fay L. and Lawrence R. Jacobs (1999). *Deliberative Democracy in Action: Evaluation of Americans Discuss Social Security*. Washington, D.C., Pew Charitable Trust.

Cook, Thomas D. and Donald T. Campbell (1979). *Quasi-Experimentation Design & Analysis Issues for Field Settings.* Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Cooke, Maeve (2000). Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy. *Political Studies,* 48: 947-969.

Craig, Stephen (1979). Efficacy, Trust, and Political Behavior: An Attempt to Resolve a Lingering Conceptual Dilemma. *American Politics Quarterly*, 7: 225-239.

Craig, Stephen C. and Michael A. Maggiotto (1982). Measuring Political Efficacy. *Political Methodology*, 8: 85-109.

Craig, Stephen C., Richard G. Niemi, and Glenn E. Silver (1990). Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items. *Political Behavior*, 12(3): 289-314.

Cronbach, Lee J. (1951). Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests. *Psychometrica*, 16: 297-334.

Cunningham, Frank (2002). *Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction*. NY: Routledge.

D'Agostino, Ralph B. and Donald B. Rubin (2000). Estimating and Using Propensity Scores with Partially Missing Data. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 95: 749-759.

Dalton, Russell (2006). *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies.* Washington: CQ Press.

Dehejia Rajeev and Sadek Wahba (1999). Casual Effects in Non-Experimental Studies: Re-Evaluating the Evaluation of Training Programs. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 94: 1053-1062.

Dehejia, Rajeev and Sadek Wahba (2002). Propensity Score Matching Methods for Non-Experimental Causal Studies. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 84(1): 151-161.

Delli Carpini, Michael X., Fay L. Cook, and Lawrence R. Jacobs (2004). Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature, *Annual Review of Political Science,* 7: 315-344.

Delli Carpini, M. and S. Keeter (1996). *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Doble, John, Damon Higgins, Jennifer Begasse, and Celeste Fisher (1996). *The Public's Capacity for Deliberation: What Can We Learn from NIF?* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: John Doble Research Associates.

Dowse, Robert E. and John A. Hughes (1972). *Political Sociology.* New York: John Wiley.

Dryzek, John S. (1990). *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Easton, David (1965). *A Systems Analysis of Political Life.* New York: Wiley.

Easton, David (1975). A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5: 435-57.

Elster, Jon (1998). Introduction. In: J. Elster (Ed.), *Deliberative Democracy*, 1-18. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Fearon, James D. (1998). Deliberation as Discussion. In: J. Elster (Ed.), *Deliberative Democracy*, 44-68. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Finkel, Steven E. (1985). Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 29(4): 891-913.

Fishkin, James S. and Robert C. Luskin (1999). Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue. In: M. McCombs and A. Reynolds (Eds.), *The Poll with a Human Face: The National Issues Convention Experiment in Political Communication*, 3-38. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Frantzich, Stephen E. (2005). *Citizen Democracy: Political Activists in a Cynical Age.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Fraser, John (1970). The Mistrustful-Efficacious Hypothesis and Political Participation. *Journal of Politics*, 32(2): 444-449.

Fung, Archon (2001). Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing. *Politics & Society*, 29(1): 73-103.

Fung, Archon (2003). Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences. *The Journal of Political Philosophy,* 11(3): 338-367.

Fung, Archon (2005). Varieties of Participation in Democratic Governance. Working Paper available at: http://www.archonfung.net/papers/FungVarietiesOfPart.pdf

Fung, Archon and Erik Olin Wright (eds.) (2003). *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*. New York, NY: Verso.

Gastil, John, Eugene P. Deess, and Phil J. Weiser (2002). Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test for the Connection between Jury Deliberation and Political Participation. *Journal of Politics,* 64: 585-595.

Gastil, John and James P. Dillard (1999a). The Aims, Methods, and Effects of Deliberative Civic Education through the National Issues Forums. *Communication Education*, 48: 1-14.

Gastil, John and James P. Dillard (1999b). Increasing Political Sophistication through Public Deliberation. *Political Communication,* 16: 3-23.

Gastil, John and Peter Levine (eds.) (2005). *The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the 21st Century*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Ginsberg, Benjamin (1982). *The Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen Control and Popular Acquiescence.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Good, I. J. and Lawrence S. Mayer (1975). Estimating the Efficacy of a Vote. *Behavioral Science*, 20: 25-33.

Gurin, Patricia and Orville G. Brim, Jr. (1984). Change in Self In Adulthood: The Example of Sense of Control. In: P. B. Baltes and O. G. Brim Jr. (Eds.), *Life-Span Development and Behavior*, 282-334.

Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson (1996). *Democracy and Disagreement.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson (2004). *Why Deliberative Democracy?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Habermas, Jürgen (1989). *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hahn, Jinyong (1998). On the Role of the Propensity Score in Efficient Parametric Estimation of Average Treatment Effects. *Econometrica*, 66(2): 315-331.

Hansen, Kasper M. and Vibeke Normann Andersen (2004). Deliberative Democracy and the Deliberative Poll on the Euro. *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 27: 261-286.

Hawkins, Brett W., Vincent L. Marando, and George A. Taylor (1971). Efficacy, Mistrust and Political Participation: Findings from Additional Data and Indicators. *The Journal of Politics*, 33(4): 1130-1136.

Heckman, James J. (1978). Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equations System. *Econometrica*, 46: 931-961.

Heckman, James J. (1979). Sample Selection Bias as Specification Error. *Econometrica*, 47: 153-161.

Heckman, James J. and Richard Robb (1985). Alternative Methods for Evaluating the Impact of Interventions. In: J. J. Heckman and B. S. Singer (Eds.), *Longitudinal Analysis of Labor Market Data*, 158-241. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Heckman, James J. and Richard Robb (1986). Alternative Methods for Solving the Problem of Selection Bias in Evaluating the Impact of Treatments on Outcomes. In: H. Wainer (Ed.), *Drawing Inferences from Self-Selected Samples*, 63-107. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Holt, Lynn (1993). Rationality is Hard Work: An Alternative Interpretation of the Disruptive Effects of Thinking about Reasons. *Philosophical Psychology*, 6(3): 251-266.

Holt, Lynn (1999). Rationality is Still Hard Work: Some Further Notes on the Disruptive Effects of Deliberation. *Philosophical Psychology*, 12(2): 215-219.

Horwitt, Sanford (1999). New Millennium Project: American Youth Attitudes on Politics, Citizenship, Government, and Voting. Lexington, KY: National Association of Secretaries of State.

Iyengar, Sheena S. and Mark R. Lepper (2000). When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79: 995-1006.

Kimmelman, D. and G. Hall (1997). *A Critical Study of Civic Deliberation and the Political Process.* New Brunswick, NJ: Walt Whitman Center Culture of Politics and Democracy, Rutgers University.

Kleiman, Michael (1976). Trends in Racial Differences in Political Efficacy: 1952 to 1972. *Phylon*, 37(2): 159-162.

Lane, R. E. (1959). *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics*. New York: Free Press.

Langton, Kenneth P., and David A. Karns (1969). The Relative Influence of the Family, Peer Group, and School in the Development of Political Efficacy. Western Political Quarterly, 22(4), 813-826.

Lazer, David, Michael Neblo, Kevin Esterling, and Kathy Goldschmidt (2009). *Online Town Meetings: Exploring Democracy in the 21st Century*. Washington, DC: Congressional Management Foundation.

Leib, Ethan J. (2004). *Deliberative Democracy in America: A Proposal for a Popular Branch of Government*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.

Levinson, Meira (2002). Dilemmas of Deliberative Civic Education. *Philosophy of Education*. Available online at http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-Yearbook/2002/262-levinson%2002.pdf

Lukensmeyer, Carolyn J. and Steven Brigham (2005). Taking Democracy to Scale – Large Scale Interventions for Citizens. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 41(1): 47-60.

Lukensmeyer, Carolyn J., Joe Goldman, Steven Brigham (2005). A Town Meeting for the Twenty-First Century. In: J. Gastil and P. Levine (Eds.), *The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the 21st Century*, 154-163. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Luskin, Robert C. and James S. Fishkin (1998). Deliberative Polling, Public Opinions and Representative Democracy: The Case of the National Issues Convention. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Opinion Research.

Luskin, Robert C. and James S. Fishkin (2003). Deliberation and "Better Citizens". Unpublished research paper from the Center for Deliberative Democracy. Available at: http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2002/bettercitizens.pdf

Luskin, Robert C., James S. Fishkin, and Roger Jowell (2002). Considered Opinions: Deliberative Polling in Britain. *British Journal of Political Science*, 32: 4555-487.

Lyons, Schley R. (1970). The Political Socialization of Ghetto Children: Efficacy and Cynicism. *The Journal of Politics*, 32(2): 288-304.

Macedo, Stephen, (Ed.) (1999). *Deliberative Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Madsen, Douglas (1978). A Structural Approach to the Explanation of Political Efficacy Levels under Democratic Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 22: 867-883.

Manin, Bernard (1987). On Legitimacy and Public Deliberation. *Political Theory,* 15(3): 338-68.

Mansbridge, Jane (1980). *Beyond Adversary Democracy.* New York, NY: Basic Books.

Mansbridge, Jane (1995). Does Participation Make Better Citizens? Paper presented at the Conference on Citizen Competence and the Design of Democratic Institutions, Committee on the Political Economy of the Good Society. Available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/pegs/mansbrid.html

Martinussen, Willy (1972).The Development of Civic Competence: Socialization or Task Generalization. *Acta Sociologica*, 15: 213-227.

Mathews, David (1994). *Politics for People: Finding a Responsible Public Voice.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Michelman, Frank (1988). Law's Republic. *Yale Law Journal,* 97: 1493-1537.

Mill, John Stuart (1997). *On Liberty*. In: A. Ryan (Ed.), *Mill: Texts and Commentaries*, 41-132. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.

Miller, Arthur H. (1974). Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970. *American Political Science Review*, 68: 951-972.

Miller, David (2000).*Citizenship and National Identity.* Oxford: Polity Press.

Morrell, Michael E. (1998). *Broadening Horizons: Can Participation Make Better Citizens?* PhD Dissertation, Arizona State University.

Morrell, Michael E. (1999). Citizens' Evaluations of Participatory Democratic Procedures: Normative Theory Meets Empirical Science. *Political Research Quarterly*, 52: 293-322.

Morrell, Michael E. (2003). Survey and Experimental Evidence for a Reliable and Valid Measure of Internal Political Efficacy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 67: 589-602.

Morrell, Michael E. (2005). Deliberation, Democratic Decision-Making and Internal Political Efficacy. *Political Behavior*, 27(1): 49-69.

Nabatchi, Tina (2010). Addressing the Citizenship and Democratic Deficits: The Potential of Deliberative Democracy for Public Administration. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 40(4): 376-399.

Neblo, Michael A., Kevin M. Esterling, Ryan P. Kennedy, David Lazer, and Anand E. Sokhey (2009). *Who Wants to Deliberate - and Why?* HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP09-027.Available at: [http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=6772].

Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik (1976). *The Changing American Voter.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Niemi, R. G., S. C. Craig, and F. Mattei (1991). Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study. *American Political Science Review,* 85(4): 1407-1413.

Olsen, Marvin E. (1982). *Participatory Pluralism*. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.

Orum, Anthony M. (1989). *Introduction to Political Sociology: the Social Anatomy of the Body Politic*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.

Pateman, Carole (1970). *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.

Radcliff, Benjamin and Ed Wingenbach (2000). Preference Aggregation, Functional Pathologies, and Democracy: A Social Choice Defense of Participatory Democracy. *The Journal of Politics*, 62(4): 977-998.

Riker, William H. (1962). *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Riker, William H. (1982). *Liberalism Against Populism*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Rosenbaum, Paul R. and Donald B. Rubin (1983). The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects. *Biometrika*, 70(1): 41-55.

Rosenbaum, Paul R. and Donald B. Rubin (1984). Reducing Bias in Observational Studies Using Subclassification on the Propensity Score. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 79: 516-524.

Skocpol, Theda and Morris P. Fiorina, Eds. (1999). Civic Engagement in American Democracy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Smith, Tom (1999). The Delegates' Experience. In: M. McCombs and A. Reynolds (Eds.), *The Poll with a Human Face: The National Issues Convention Experiment in Political Communication*, 39-58. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Stolle, Dietlind and Marc Hooghe (2004). Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The Debated about the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Western Societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35: 149-167.

Sturgis, Patrick, Caroline Roberts, and Nicholas Allum (2005). A Different Take on the Deliberative Poll: Information, Deliberation and Attitude Constraint. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 69: 30-65.

Sulkin, Tracy and Adam F. Simon (2001). Habermas in the Lab: A Study of Deliberation in an Experimental Setting. *Political Psychology*, 22(4): 809-826.

Teixeira, Ruy A. (1992). *The Disappearing American Voter*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Torres, Lars H. (2003). Deliberative Democracy: A Survey of the Field. Report prepared for the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. [Available at: http://www.americaspeaks.org/library/delib_field_report_no_table.pdf]

UAC (2006). http://www.unitedagendaforchildren.org/

Verba, Sidney and Norman Nie (1972). *Participation In America: Social Equality and Political Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.

Walsh, Katherine C. (2003). The Democratic Potential of Civic Dialogue on Race. Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Weissberg, Robert (1975). Political Efficacy and Illusion. *Journal of Politics*, 37: 469-487.

White, Elliott S. (1968). Intelligence and Sense of Political Efficacy in Children. *The Journal of Politics,* 30(3): 710-731.

Williamson, Abigail (2004). *Mapping Public Deliberation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Wilson, Timothy D. and Jonathan W. Schooler (1991). Thinking Too Much: Introspection can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 60: 181-192.

Wilson, Timothy D., Dana Dunn, Delores Kraft, and Douglas J. Lisle (1989). Introspection, Attitude Change, and Attitude Behavior Consistency: The Disruptive Effects of Explaining Why We Feel The Way We Do. In: L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,* 22: 287-343. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

Wright, James (1976). *The Dissent of the Governed.* New York: Academic Press.

Young, Iris Marion (2000). *Inclusion and Democracy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.